

Ethics – Etika

XIth Bled Philosophical Conference


11. Konferenca o analitični filozofiji

2nd – 6th June 2003 / 2.6. – 6.6. 2003

Bled, Hotel Kompas

Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Science

Društvo za analitično filozofijo in filozofijo znanosti



Ljubljana 2003

PROGRAM

Monday, June 2nd

On Utilitarianism—Part 1

10:15-11:15 Kirk Ludwig, “Hare’s Argument for Utilitarianism”

Symposium: Ethics and Logic

1:30-2:30 Mark Brown, “Can Deontic Logic Be of Any Help in Our Thinking about Ethics?”

2:45-3:45 Boran Berčić, “The Ethics of Logical Positivism”

4:00-5:00 Markus Stepanians, “The General Logical Form of Rights”

Tuesday, June 3rd

Symposium: On the Nature of Moral Properties and Moral Reasoning

9:00-10:00 Lorand Ambrus-Lakatos, “Game Theory and Moral Reasoning”

10:15-11:15 Nathan Nobis, “From Moral Anti-Realism to Philosophical Anti-Realism (And Back Again)”

11:30-12:30 Matjaž Potrč, “Particularism and Resultance”

2:30-3:30 Miroslava Andjelković, “On Friendship”

On Utilitarianism—Part 2

3:45-4:45 Hon-Lam Li, “Scanlon on Aggregation”

Wednesday, June 4th

10:00-11:00 Nenad Mišćević, “Morality and Response Dependence”

11:00-1:30 *Student Session*

Matija Arko (University of Maribor): “Existence as a First-order Predicate”

Vojko Strahovnik (University of Ljubljana): "*Prima facie* duty is not the same as *ceteris paribus* duty"

Matej Sušnik (University of Zagreb): "Naturalistic Moral Realism and the Epistemic Dependence of Moral Properties"

Andrasz Szigeti (CEU, Budapest): "Inescapable Practices: Reconciliatory Compatibilism and Moral Responsibility"

Thursday, June 5th

Symposium: Ethics and Responsibility

- 9:00-10:00 Danilo Šuster, "Is DA (Direct Argument for Incompatibility of Moral Responsibility and Determinism) a DOA?"
- 10:15-11:15 Ferenc Huoranszki, "Luck and Responsibility"
- 11:30-12:30 Friderik Klampfer, "Negative Moral Responsibility: A Half-Hearted Defense"

Symposium: Internalism, or not!

- 2:30-3:30 Jon Tresan, "Metaethical Internalism Defended"
- 3:45-4:45 Crystal Thorpe, "Why You Shouldn't Be A Humean Internalist"
- 5:00-6:00 Elvio Baccarini, "Moral Qualities as Dispositional Qualities"

Friday, June 6th

- 9:00-10:00 Snježana Prijic-Samaržija, "Embryo Experimentation and Sorites Paradox"
- 10:15-11:15 Alastair Norcross, "Harming in Context"
- 11:30-12:30 Louis Pojman, "The Case for Cosmopolitanism"

Symposium: Duties to Strangers

- 2:30-3:30 Bruce Russell, "What We Owe to Strangers: Considering the Extremes"
- 3:45-4:45 Mylan Engel, Jr., "Taking Hunger Seriously"
- 4:45 Closing Remarks

Abstracts

Lorand Ambrus-Lakatos
CEU Budapest, Hungary //

Game Theory and Moral Reasoning

In this paper, I would like to argue that non-cooperative game theory has only a very limited use for moral philosophy. I will point first to the commitments of this theory in the area of rational deliberation. Then I will discuss several proposals for how to amend its basic framework so that it could cope with some palpable paradoxes. I will also deal with the issue of the relationship between non-cooperative and cooperative game theory, from the point of view of ethics.

Miroslava Andjelković
University of Belgrade, Serbia //

On Friendship

The topic of friendship is, as most other topics, introduced into philosophy by Aristotle. Two books of *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle devotes to the concept of *philia*, i.e. to the concept of friendship. Although his division of friendship into three kinds (advantage-friendship, pleasure-friendship and virtue-friendship) seems to be eternal, his understanding of the perfect friendship raised many disputes. Aristotle's view of the perfect friendship as the friendship of men who are good and alike in virtue, culminates in his thought that one's friend in this sense is one's another self. This point of Aristotle's has always been the main target of criticism.

I shall not attempt to defend Aristotle's notion of perfect friendship in general, but I will argue that there is an important kind of friendship that would be impossible if the friends are not seen as "selves" of one another. The kind of friendship I am describing in the paper elucidates a thing I am going to claim is the main *telos* of friendship: without a friend in virtue one, if not a God, is not able to gain the freedom of spirit, i.e. one's inner freedom. Or finally: without a friend in virtue one is not able to be oneself, *eo ipso*, without a friend one is not able to be good.

Elvio Baccharini
University of Rijeka, Croatia

Moral Qualities as Dispositional Qualities

The contemporary debate on the metaphysical status of moral qualities has most of the time been centered on the idea that moral qualities, if they exist in real world, must be a kind of primary qualities, i.e. qualities that exist *there* independently of subjects perceiving them, or able to perceive them under some conditions.

A different approach says that moral qualities are not completely detached from subjects that perceive them, or may perceive them. However, they are not even qualities totally projected in the world by some subjects. They are dispositions to create a certain kind of evaluative

reaction in particular beings, with a specific kind of sensibility. The analogy with secondary qualities is clear.

There are two general ways of approaching the dispositional model. In one way, the approach is naturalistic. In this case, what matters are individuals as they are, and perhaps the only relevant thing is to establish some conditions that indicates when they are in appropriate circumstances. Some authors identify this approach with that proposed by David Hume (but the thesis is not totally uncontroversial).

In the other case, we have an approach which is normativistic. There are conditions of appropriateness even for the subjects themselves. Perhaps, supporters of this model will say that what matters is the moral perception of the *virtuous* subject, not of any subject. A moral quality is, therefore, a quality perceived by the virtuous subject (where the 'virtuous subject' is defined normatively and not by a classic naturalistic description). This approach can be assimilated to an Aristotelian paradigm (the author to whom I refer is primarily John McDowell).

There is a fundamental problem related to the normativistic approach. How can we establish who is the virtuous person? It seems that we need some independent moral reasons to do this. But, it is difficult to establish these independent moral reasons if the virtuous person herself is the subject who establishes the criteria of appropriate moral perception. The situation is not much easier if we refer to a moral community instead of a singular virtuous subject as the source of criteria of appropriateness. A threat of circularity appears here. However, the (vicious) circularity may be avoidable if we consider the possibility of having moral judgments at different levels in a coherentist process. My thesis is that this model is particularly suitable in an internalistic dimension, when a subject is assessing a moral system by and for herself, which is one of the levels of moral thinking.

A different level of moral thinking is that of the subject entering in a wider community, e.g. a political society. In this case, if she wants to cooperate and not to repress other individuals, the individual has to take a perspective close to that of the ideal observer. From this perspective she has to evaluate all the interested parties by the same concern, detaching herself from her personal values. Here happens the detachment of the individual from her system of values, and the equal consideration of each person's value. The individual tries to evade from her system of values and the particular way of seeing facts that comes from her moral outlook, and tries to adopt a neutral standpoint that gives equal concern to the values of all parties in the relevant moral situation. My thesis is that this model is particularly suitable in assessing a moral system in its social dimension.

Boran Berčić
University of Rijeka, Croatia

The Ethics of Logical Positivism

The aim of this paper is to present ethical or rather meta-ethical views of the Vienna Circle. Members of the Circle are usually perceived as tough eliminativists about ethics and value-discourse in general. This view is, broadly speaking, true. However, it neglects the fact that their analyses were often penetrating and interesting. Carnap and Ayer believed that ethical sentences have no cognitive content. They justify their claim by appeal to the principle of

verifiability – since ethical sentences are neither factual nor analytic, they have no cognitive content. Carnap therefore concluded that ethical sentences are in fact hidden imperatives. For the same reason Ayer thought that value judgments essentially express emotions. Nevertheless, Ayer offered interesting and detailed analysis of ethical discourse. He argued that ethical discourse contains many analytic claims as well as many factual claims, by means of philosophical analysis he rejected utilitarianism, subjectivism and objectivism. On the other hand, Neurath and Schlick believed that ethics should be science grounded on empirical footing. Neurath argued that traditional ethics should be replaced with the *empirical Felicitology* – scientific study of the factors relevant for the human happiness. While Schlick, following Mill's utilitarianism, proposed *naturalism eudaemonism*.

Mark A. Brown
Syracuse University, USA
Ethics and Deontic Logic

Early work in deontic logic was so simplistic as to discourage ethicists, no doubt rightly, from taking it seriously. More recent work that goes under the name of deontic logic has become far more diverse and for more sophisticated--so much so that it has in a sense become a different body of investigation--and makes deontic logic worth a second look. Much current work has been motivated by concerns--some practical and some theoretical--in law, business, and computer science. What unites these is a need for formal languages in which we can express both normative claims about how things ought to be and non-normative claims about how things are, and draw appropriate inferences relating the two. I suggest some ways in which reflection on this more recent work (and even, retrospectively, on some of the early work) can be of value for our thinking about ethics; I also indicate some of the limitations which--so far, at least--deontic logic still suffers as a tool for philosophical investigation.

Mylan Engel, Jr.
Northern Illinois University, USA

Taking Hunger Seriously

An argument is advanced for the moral obligatoriness of (O₁) supporting famine relief organizations through financial contributions and (O₂) refraining from squandering food in situations of food scarcity. Unlike other ethical arguments for the obligation to assist the world's absolutely poor, my argument is not predicated on any highly contentious ethical theory which you reject. Rather, it is predicated on your beliefs. The argument shows that the things you currently believe already commit you to the obligatoriness of helping to reduce malnutrition and famine-related diseases by sending a nominal percentage of your income to famine relief organizations and by not squandering food that could be fed to them. Consistency with your own beliefs implies that to do any less is to be profoundly immoral.

Ferenc Huoranszki
CEU Budapest, Hungary //
Luck and Responsibility

In moral context luck is understood at least in two ways. On the one hand luck is sometimes interpreted as a factor that, by definition, exempts one from responsibility. On the other, luck can be interpreted as a factor which, though relevant to agents' responsibility, is not within their control. This second understanding implies that the scope of responsibility is larger than the scope of what agents can control. The paper argues that the second view is correct.

There is a rich pool of examples about the factors, which agents cannot control, yet are relevant in attributing responsibility to them: the consequences of certain actions, the circumstances in which choices must be made and agents' mental constitution. In the talk I wish to focus on the last kind of examples. Hume once argued that the final ground on which we blame or praise people is their character. Our actions are morally valued only derivatively as manifestations of our character. But can we control our own character?

Some say – following Aristotle – that we can. Even if we do not have direct control over our character – we cannot change our traits simply by deciding that we want to change them – there are indirect ways for us to change it. I will show that there are only a limited number of traits of which this is true. Many more traits are such that we cannot try intentionally to change them. Consequently, luck matters for responsibility.

Friderik Klampfer
University of Maribor, Slovenia //

Negative Moral Responsibility: A Half-Hearted Defense

That we are morally responsible for what we do willingly and knowingly, is a commonplace. That our moral responsibility extends as far as to cover at least the intended consequences of our voluntary actions and perhaps also the ones we did not intend, but could or did foresee, is equally beyond dispute. But what about omissions? Are we, or can we be, (equally) morally responsible for harm that has occurred because we did not prevent it, even though we could have done? Say, for all the enormous suffering, caused daily by famine, deprivation and curable diseases in the Third World countries? The aim of the paper is to explore the prospects for a viable notion of negative responsibility, consider its implications for moral theories and principles and offer some prima facie reasons for its legitimate, though limited, use in moral reasoning.

Hon-Lam Li
University of Hongkong //

Scanlon on Aggregation

Contemporary moral and political philosophy to a great extent has been concerned with undermining utilitarianism and replacing it with a more plausible theory. John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* was a famous attempt to replace utilitarianism in political philosophy. Thomas Scanlon's paper, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," and his book, *What We Owe to*

Each Other, are an important attempt to replace utilitarianism in ethics. Any attempt to replace utilitarianism is successful only if the proposed theory (which seeks to replace utilitarianism) will lead to a non-utilitarian conclusion. In this regard, John Harsanyi has forcefully argued that what can be derived from the original position in Rawls's theory is not the Difference Principle, but the Principle of Average Utilitarianism. In this paper, I will argue that Scanlon's attempt to replace utilitarianism is unsuccessful.

Kirk Ludwig
University of Florida, USA //

Hare's Argument for Utilitarianism

The two central pillars of R. M. Hare's ethical theory are his argument for prescriptivism and his argument for (preference) utilitarianism. The former is a position in metaethics, the theory of the nature of moral judgments, and the latter is a position in normative ethics, the theory of the content of moral judgments. Of particular interest in Hare's theory is that his position in normative ethics is supposed to derive from his position in metaethics, plus certain general requirements on rationality. It is Hare's ingenious argument from prescriptivism to utilitarianism that I examine in this paper. The striking nature of this argument is brought out in this statement of Hare's about it:

... if we assumed a perfect command of logic and of the facts, they would constrain so severely the moral evaluations that we can make, that in practice we would be bound all to agree to the same ones. . the freedom which we have as moral thinkers is a freedom to reason, i.e., to make rational moral evaluations; and the rules of this reasoning, which are determined by the concepts occurring in the questions we are answering, bring it about that, over the most important part of morality, we shall, if we are rational, exercise our freedom in only one way. (Moral Thinking, p. 7)

If Hare's argument is correct it would show how to ground inquiry into what the correct moral judgments to make are in a way that would allow us in principle to settle moral disputes on the basis of nothing but clear-headed agreement both on the moral language (philosophical logic) and what the actual facts were. This takes moral argument in principle out of the realm of appeal to intuitions and grounds it on linguistic and non-linguistic facts.

Hare's argument rests on the claim that the dual prescriptive and descriptive nature of moral judgments requires that (1) if we sincerely make any moral judgments, we are committed to universalizing them, that is, to making them no matter what our position might be in the circumstance in which we make them. He combines this with the claim that (2) the right moral judgment to make is the one which one would make under conditions of full information about the relevant consequences of doing what one prescribes in making the moral judgment. Then he argues that (3) to have full information about the relevant consequences, one must know what it would be like for anyone who would be affected by doing what one prescribes be done in the circumstances. Further, (4) to know what it would be like for anyone who would be affected by doing what one prescribes be done in the circumstances, Hare argues, one must have certain conditional preferences, with a certain strength *S*, of the form, were I so and so, with such and such preferences-where these are the preferences of so and so-then let it be that *p*, where this is in fact what so and so prefers in the

circumstances with strength S . Thus, full information about the relevant consequences is supposed to require us to have conditional preferences corresponding to all of the preferences of anyone who is affected in the circumstances. This, combined with the requirement that we universalize our prescriptions, that is, be willing to make them from any point of view in the circumstances, is supposed to lead us to "treat other people's prescriptions ... as if they were our own" (p. 17), i.e., to lead to a kind of summing of the preferences of everyone affected in the circumstances in a way that yields as the right judgment the one which maximizes preference satisfaction over all affected individuals, i.e., the right judgment is the one which is prescribed by preference utilitarianism.

My main points of critical interest are (1) the grounding in Hare's prescriptivism of the requirement that we universalize moral prescriptions, and (2) the argument from the kind of universality this commits Hare to the conclusion that moral judgments made in the light of all relevant information will be the ones endorsed by preference utilitarianism. With respect to the latter, I give particular attention to (a) what should count as relevant information, and (b) whether, if as Hare says, it includes what it is like to be any individual affected by the carrying out of a prescription, this requires having conditional preferences that mirror the preferences of each individual who is affected. I argue that prescriptivism does not in fact rationally require universalizability, that the sort of universalizability Hare argues it does lead to will not yield a classical utilitarian result by any means, that knowing what it is like to be another is not in general a rational requirement on getting full information about what is relevant to making a universal prescription, that to know what it is like to be another, one need not have corresponding preferences of the sort Hare argues that we must have, and, finally, that requiring this as a condition on rational decision makes it impossible to satisfy other, prior, demands of practical rationality.

Nenad Miščević
University of Maribor, Slovenia //

Morality and Response Dependence

Moral value is constitutively dependent on evaluators' responses or dispositions to respond, claims response-dependence or dispositionalist account of value (RD-account for short). The paper develops the account, considering classical and recent objections (e.g. B. Williams, B. Stroud, T. Cuneo). (1) There is no purely physical basis for moral properties, (2) Moral properties have realistic phenomenology: values do not feel like dispositions. (3) RD-accounts lead to pluralism, relativism and cultural rootedness.

The paper proposes to look at iterated response-dependence (Chocolate is tasty (higher response) because it is sweet (lower response)). P is an iteratively response dependent (IRD) property iff P is constituted by response to an already response-dependent property. The paper argues that some moral values are iteratively response-dependent, e.g. an action being noble might depend on its being compassionate. Thin moral values depend on response to underlying thick ones. Iterated RD-account helps answering objections. Ad (1), there is a physical-cum-psychological bases for action-properties, which then in turn serves as basis for low-level value properties, which in turn base thick, and further thin moral value properties. Ad (2): iteration creates opacity. Opacity produces realistic phenomenology. Ad (3) Thick value responses (e.g. "This is a brave act") depend on complicated, layered and iterated responses of lower level, that might be culturally conditioned. Once the structure is

unpacked, one can begin to search for moral universals. The proposed iterated RD-account is contrasted with anti-explanationist, quietist competitors, both dispositionalist (McDowell) and non-dispositionalist ones, and defended.

Nathan Nobis
University Rochester, USA

From Moral Anti-Realism to Philosophical Anti-Realism (And Back Again)

It is not uncommon for philosophers, and, perhaps, non-philosophers (especially students), to question or reject moral realism. I aim to defend moral realism. Moral anti-realists argue that morality has peculiar features that warrant an anti-realist understanding of its subject matter. But morality is not unique in those features: many other philosophical (and non-philosophical) areas of inquiry share in them. So the more common and forceful objections to moral realism seem to apply equally well to other areas of philosophy, particularly epistemology. If the presence of these allegedly peculiar features that moral anti-realists identify is sufficient to warrant an anti-realist understanding of a subject matter, then anti-realists in ethics should also be anti-realists in epistemology and, perhaps, philosophy in general. I will explain what epistemic anti-realisms might consist in and argue that these views, and broader philosophical anti-realisms, cannot be coherently maintained or defended, note that few moral anti-realists accept this kind anti-realism, and argue that since this broader anti-realism follows from general premises offered against moral anti-realism, those premises should be rejected. Thus, moral, epistemic, and philosophical realisms are defended.

Alastair Norcross
Rice University, USA //
Harming in Context

The standard consequentialist account of harm is given by the following principle: HARM An act A harms a person P iff P is worse off, as a consequence of A, than she would have been if A hadn't been performed. An act A benefits a person P iff P is better off, as a consequence of A, than she would have been if A hadn't been performed. Through a consideration of problem cases, including cases of overdetermination and preemption, I argue that there is no satisfactory way of identifying the relevant alternative to the action in question. I propose instead a contextualist analysis of harm and benefit.

Louis Pojman
United States Military Academy

The Case for Cosmopolitanism

In this paper I consider both moral and nonmoral reasons for world government, what has been called 'institutional cosmopolitanism.' I first describe several nonmoral forces leading to the need for a central international governing body and then offer three Moral Arguments for Cosmopolitanism. These are:

1. The Moral Point of View: The Principle of Humanity and the Moral Equality of Persons
2. The Argument from Associational Advantage
3. The Argument from Equal Opportunity

I then argue that the case for moral cosmopolitanism together with the nonmoral forces leading to globalism support a case for institutional cosmopolitanism.

Matjaž Potrč
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia //

Particularism and resultance

Moral particularism is a promising new approach which understands itself as a subchapter of holism in the theory of reasons. So particularism may be extended to other areas, such as metaphysics. One of the bases for this kind of move is elaborated by particularism itself as resultance, a strategy for providing the relevant basis that is opposed to various forms of generalism (the thin property of goodness is constituted by several thick properties, such as being good humoured, being pleasant; the property of this being a table is constituted from properties of there being four legs, a plate, a certain arrangement). It is claimed that resultance or emergence needs a background structure in order to get off the ground.

Snježana Prijic-Samaržija
University of Rijeka, Croatia //

Embryo Experimentation and Sorites Paradox

This article considers whether the continuity argument really supports the approach according to which fertilization is a determinant of moral status. Precisely, it examines whether a moral and legal condemnation of embryo experimentation can be based on this allegedly sound argument according to which fertilization is necessary marker event because in the post-fertilization period a continuum of developmental changes is such that it is impossible to isolate any stage to which we could attribute the attainment of moral status. I try to show that scientific facts and the requirement of logical consistency do not support such an inference, that is, that: (i) the assumption that after fertilization there are no genetic and numeric developmental changes is not scientifically grounded; (ii) there are no scientific consensus that in the post-fertilization development there are no events or processes to which the status of crucial transformational or discontinuous event can be ascribed, (iii) to derive a conclusion that fertilization is a necessary marker event from the fact that the post-fertilization process is a gradual leads to sorites paradoxes.

Bruce Russell
Wayne University, USA //

What We Owe to Strangers: Considering the Extremes

How much effort and sacrifice are we required to make to help strangers in need? Some libertarians think that we do not even have an obligation to save a child from drowning in a

shallow pond when we are the only person around. Others think that, other things being equal, we are required to take an innocent person's life if that is the only way we can save two or more other innocent people. Peter Unger thinks it would be permissible, maybe even obligatory, to cut off someone's foot without his consent if that was needed to save sixty, or even six. I argue against both extremes: we have an obligation to save the child in the shallow pond, but it is wrong to kill some, or even to cut off someone's foot, against his will to save others.

Markus Stepanians
University of Saarland, Germany //

Hohfeldians and Anti-Hohfeldians on the Interpersonality of Rights

That all rights are always someone's rights *to some good* seems uncontroversial among rights theorists. Hohfeld and his followers, however, think it necessary to go further. For them, rights are not only *to some good* but also, in virtue of the meaning of "right", *against someone else*. They are three-term relations between two persons and a good of the form [to&against] "A has right to X against B". This aspect of a Hohfeldian view on rights, i.e. what I call their "necessary interpersonality" has recently come under attack. The new Anti-Hohfeldians believe, in the words of H. J. McCloskey, "that the difficulties of 'rights against' talk, and any attempt to write into the concept of a right, that it must be against someone, are evident" — or at least serious. Anti-Hohfeldians hold that interpersonality is perhaps a frequent, but nonetheless contingent feature of rights, and that rights are mere two-term relations between a person and a good as in [to] "A has a right to X". Against this background the still unresolved issue of the "Correlativity of Rights and Duties" is (re-)interpreted as a controversy about the question whether rights necessarily require the existence of a correlative bearer of a duty — a second person. In line with this interpretation it is argued that MacCormick's objections against correlativity should be viewed as an attack on [to&against] and the implied Hohfeldian claim that rights are for conceptual reasons interpersonal. Moreover, I defend the Hohfeldians against the charge that they are incapable of giving an account of rights *in rem*, and try to show how the anti-Hohfeldian denial of necessary interpersonality leads naturally to the Raz/MacCormick doctrine of the "dynamic aspect of rights".

Danilo Šuster
University of Maribor, Slovenia //

Is DA (Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Moral Responsibility and Determinism) a DOA?

In discussion about "deep" philosophical problems it is often claimed, on the ground of a priori philosophical reflection, that there are no arguments for (in)validity of X which do not presuppose Y. But the assumption of Y begs the question, so the arguments can be dismissed. I analyse two problematic instances of this scheme with respect to the direct argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism. David Widerker claims that the direct argument presupposes the principle that a person is morally responsible for performing some action only if she could have avoided acted as she did. But I argue that the principle of unavoidability is entailed and not presupposed by the direct argument. The Kane/Widerker objection to the so called Frankfurt-style cases is, that they work only if compatibility of

moral responsibility and causal determinism is assumed, yet this assumption begs the question against the libertarian. I argue that the aim of the Frankfurt cases is to establish that even if determinism eliminates avoidability this does not entail the absence of moral responsibility. In order to achieve this goal, the assumption of determinism is not question-begging.

Crystal Thorpe
University of Florida Gainesville, USA //

Why You Shouldn't Be a Humean Internalist

Internalism about reasons is the view that there is a necessary connection between an agent's reasons and her motives. Humean internalism about reasons combines this thesis with Humean motivational theses, while rationalist internalism about reasons combines this thesis with rationalist motivational theses. At first glance, Humean internalism is an attractive view. Motivationally, it only countenances those claims we have strong and compelling reason to accept, metaphysically, it is parsimonious with respect to normativity, and, as a theory of reasons, it both captures our idea that reasons are action-guiding, and it satisfies the explanation requirement and the justification requirement, two requirements on reasons for action that most reasons theorists accept. Upon closer inspection, however, it is not so attractive. As I argue, it commits us to one of two equally unattractive claims about a person's reasons. It either commits us to the claim that a person's reasons are fixed, stable, and unchanging over a lifetime, or it commits us to the claim that a person's reasons track the non-rational and irrational flux that occurs in any person's motivational set.

Jon Tresan
University of Florida, USA //

Metaethical Internalism Defended

Metaethical Internalism says that moral beliefs require motivational or affective states ('conations'). E.g. a typical Internalist claim has it that believing that x is right requires a pro-attitude to x. (The Internalism meant is variously referred to as 'Judgement' or 'Appraiser' Internalism 'about motivation'.) Here I defend a version of Internalism.

Externalists reject Internalism for three reasons. First, they charge that it would have dubious metaethical upshot, e.g. Noncognitivism or 'queer' intrinsically action-guiding properties. Secondly, they find 'amoralists' intuitively possible (amoralists have moral beliefs but not the relevant conations). Third, they've offered various debunking explanations of the intuition that amoralists aren't possible.

My defense is a defense with a twist, for I concede that Noncognitivism and 'queer' properties are dubious, and that amoralists are possible. I argue that, nevertheless, there is a recognizable version of Internalism which has no dubious metaethical upshot and is consistent with individual amoralists. It is, moreover, intuitively plausible; and none of the debunking explanations succeed.

Student papers

Matija Arko
University of Maribor, Slovenia //

Existence as a First-order Predicate

In this paper I am going to argue that existence is a first order predicate. I am going to consider the main arguments of the three most important philosophers (Immanuel Kant, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell) who defended the view that existence is not a (first order) predicate. Kant distinguishes on one hand between real properties, which when ascribed to the subject give us some quality of the subject, and existence as merely logical uninformative predicate on the other. I advocate the view that some predicates (like existence for example) belong to both groups at the same time. I will also try to refute Frege's claim that existential-statements are special case of number-statements, which always involve second order properties. The last argument is formulated by C. McGinn. The main point of this argument is that singular existential statements are not rendered superfluous by logical analysis but are rather presupposed.

Vojko Strahovnik
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia //

Prima facie duty is not the same as *ceteris paribus* duty

The popularity of moral particularism is increasing. Along with this, *prima facie* duties based moral pluralism of Ross regains its recognition too. I claim that a recurrently practiced interpretation taking the notion of *prima facie* duty as analogous to *ceteris paribus* duty (or *pro tanto* duty) is a misinterpretation. The understanding that I wish to put into question builds on an overly simplified picture: There are three basic types of moral rules – exceptionless rules, soft rules (or *ceteris paribus* rules that allow for exceptions) and finally the particularist "rules". In their turn, these seem to fit nicely to moral monism, to moral pluralism and to moral particularism. Taking things in such a simplified manner however is a mistake to which both Mark Timmons and Mitchell Haney succumb. The notion of *prima facie* duty as it is presented in Ross's *The Right and the Good* (1930) is basically a metaphysical concept. In opposition to this, one should understand the notion of *ceteris paribus* or *pro tanto* duty as a normative concept. Moreover, *prima facie* duties (or rules) permit no exceptions whatsoever. Therefore, the following two statements are not synonymous:

- (1) "Lying is *prima facie* wrong."
- (2) (2) "Lying is *ceteris paribus* wrong." (or "*Ceteris paribus*, lying is wrong.")

The former states how every act which has as a part of its nature the feature of being a lie is wrong in virtue of this feature or at least (in situations where other *prima facie* duties are present) that it is worse off as it would be without this feature. The latter states that lying is wrong in "typical" circumstances, but it could also happen that the act of lying could sometimes be morally right or at least morally neutral.

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Inescapable Practices: Reconciliatory Compatibilism and Moral Responsibility

In his seminal paper, 'Freedom and resentment' Peter Strawson put forward the view that the practice of holding people responsible is a natural given of human life to which we are all inescapably committed. Among others, this argument is interesting because it appears to offer a new strategy to reconcile determinism and moral responsibility. The central claim of this Strawsonian reconciliatory compatibilism is that since moral responsibility is a natural constant of human action and thought, metaphysical considerations regarding the consequences of determinism are simply irrelevant to our normative practices involving the notion of responsibility. This approach rests on two, largely independent, arguments:

A. The argument from inescapability: (A1) The normative practice of holding people responsible is inescapable; (A2) The inescapability of this practice constitutes a sufficient justification of this practice; (A3) Therefore: the truth (or falsity) of determinism is irrelevant to the justification of the practice of holding people responsible; (A4) Therefore: determinism and the practice of holding people responsible are compatible.

B. The argument from the failure of generalization strategy: (B1) All responsibility-undermining conditions recognized by our practice of holding people responsible are of a normative sort; (B2) These normative considerations would not generalize even if the thesis of determinism turned out to be true; (B3) Therefore: even if we could, *ex hypothesi*, escape the practice of holding people responsible, the truth (or falsity) of determinism would never make us do so; (B4) Therefore: determinism and the practice of holding people responsible are compatible.

By contrast, I argue in my paper with regard to the first argument that despite the merits of the Strawsonian account in demonstrating the practical inescapability of the practice of holding people responsible, even if we are indeed in practice incapable of giving up this practice, we may come to recognize that there may be reasons questioning whether it is ultimately justifiable. So even if (A1) is correct, (A2) will be false.

The second argument must be rejected as well. While premisses (B1) and (B2) are true, conclusions (B3) and (B4) do not follow. This is because the argument rests in addition on the hidden premise that the thesis of determinism can yield no normative considerations whatsoever. But this hidden premise is wrong because the truth (or falsity) of determinism remains crucially relevant to the justifiability of our responsibility-attributing practices. The main reason for this is that we expect judgements concerning the responsibility of this or that agent to be true to the facts and to be true to the facts in a reliable, i.e. not merely contingent, fashion. But this will not be the case if determinism is true. I conclude, therefore, that Strawson and his followers have not succeeded in showing that even if determinism is true our practice of holding people responsible is justified all things considered, nor that normative accounts of human action and agency can simply ignore the problem of determinism.

▪ GENERAL INFORMATION

Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, in 1993 at first as a continuation of the IUC - Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy but they gradually started a life of their own, with the help of Eugene Mills. The first week of June at Bled is traditionally reserved for a conference dedicated to various topics in the field of analytical philosophy. *Ethics* is the *eleventh* Bled Philosophical Conference. All events take place in Hotel *Kompas*, Cankarjeva 2, Bled.

▪ ORGANISATION

The conference is organized by a team consisting of *Mylan Engel* of the Northern Illinois University, *Matjaž Potrč* of the University of Ljubljana, *Nenad Miščević* of the University of Maribor, and *Danilo Šuster* of the University of Maribor. The conference is included in the program of the activities of the *Slovenian Society for Analytic Philosophy*.

▪ FINANCIAL SUPPORT

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