

**ABSTRACTS** listed alphabetically by author's (or first author's) last name

**Saba Bazargan-Forward** (UC San Diego)

**“Authority, Cooperation, and Accountability”**

On a common-sense picture, an individual's accountability for a wrongful harm is limited by her *causal reach*—what she can cause and what she can prevent. The problem with this common-sense view, though, is that it seems to under-impute accountability in cases where multiple individuals are working together toward a collectively caused harm. To address this problem, I make the case for thinking that distinct aspects of human agency, normally wrapped up in a single individual, can be practically distributed across different individuals. This resulting division of *agential* labor makes possible a distinctive way in which one person might be accountable for the actions of another. I develop this form of interpersonal accountability into an approach to handling problems of accountability in the context of cooperation.

**Radim Bělohrad** (Masaryk)

**“The moral status of selecting for deafness”**

Modern reproductive technologies offer prospective parents unprecedented opportunities in selecting their children's characteristics. One of the most controversial cases in recent years has been the decision of some deaf couples to use IVF and PGD to select a genetically deaf embryo in order to have a deaf child. Although the decision sparked a strong negative response from the hearing majority, the advocates provide some thought-provoking arguments to the effect that such practice is not immoral. These arguments force us to consider the relative costs and benefits of being deaf, the nature of disability and culture, the capacity of the community to take care of the needs and desires of their members, and parents' obligations to society in making procreative decisions. Advocates of selecting for deafness maintain that a close inspection of these aspects reveals that the practice is not morally wrong. Further, using the non-identity problem, they argue that the selected child cannot possibly be harmed by the decision. In my talk, I will assess these claims and argue that a) none of the major arguments presented by the advocates establish conclusively that the practice is not immoral and b) that the practice is immoral because it is an instance of 'imposed dependence'. In response to the non-identity-based argument, I will suggest that some theories of personal identity may offer the resources to tackle the problem.

**Amy Berg** (Oberlin College)

**“On Being Bad at Things”**

It's good for us to be cheerfully and permanently bad at some of the things we care about, and it's generally bad for us to be good at everything we do. Being bad at things is often necessary for achievement, resilience, and commitment. More importantly, being bad at things is prudentially valuable even when we never get good at the things we care about. Permanent mediocrity allows us to develop virtuous contentment, live well-rounded lives, and appreciate the value and rarity of genuine excellence. The value of being bad at things has been an underappreciated facet of well-being—and it poses a particular threat for perfectionism about well-being.

**Lorraine Besser** (Middlebury College)

**“Reimagining the Quality of Life”**

In recent papers, I've defended the intrinsic value of the interesting, and the intrinsic disvalue of the boring. This move encourages us to broaden our understanding of experiential value, for it shows that when it comes to experiences, there's more value at stake than pleasure alone. It also shows that there is value to cognitive engagement itself, even when it is unstructured by desires and/or reasons. In this paper, I'll explore the important consequences these conclusions have for how we appraise the quality

of life of subjects at the margins of life. My particular focus will be on subjects with dramatically impaired cognitive capacities (such as patients with advanced Alzheimer's, or patients in a persistent vegetative state). Because these subjects lack competency and are incapable of having and/or expressing desires, decisions about the quality of their lives are made primarily on the basis of sentience. I'll show how re-imagining the quality of life to include a subject's capacity to experience the interesting provides us with a more suitable framework to understand the value of such patient's life.

**Mia Biturajac** (University of Rijeka)

### **"Compassionate Revisionism and Harm"**

The debate on mental disorder has been one of the central ones in philosophy of psychiatry for the last forty years. The aim of the debate was to define mental disorders, to delineate criteria which would divide pathological from nonpathological conditions. The main positions were divided into three camps: normativists (those who claim that the notion of mental disorder is necessarily value-laden), naturalists (who claim that mental disorders can be defined entirely in value-free terms) and hybrid theorists (combination of both naturalist and normativist strands of thought into a single theory).

Dominic Murphy (2005) offers an elaborate taxonomy of positions more nuanced than the classical divide between naturalism and normativism. He divides the debate into two main strains, objectivism and constructivism, each being subdivided into two variants, conservatism and revisionism. Murphy sides with revisionist objectivism and proposes a two-stage picture of mental disorder: "first, we agree on facts about the failure of someone's bodily systems to function properly. When we have decided that, there is still a question about how to think of the person who is malfunctioning."

In this work I voice skepticism of Murphy's analysis. I offer an additional strand in Murphy's taxonomy called compassionate revisionism. Compassionate revisionism contains elements of both objectivist and constructivist perspectives. It recognizes the importance and the validity of scientific research and evidence, considering it as an integral part of medical practice. However, it is conjoined with normative considerations about how a condition impacts someone's life. It takes into consideration the first-person perspective of the patient and assessment of their condition from their own point of view. Additionally, it considers the historical mistreatment of psychiatric patients devoting itself to revisionism as a permanent atmosphere of the psychiatric practice. Harm can be considered as a central and focal element of compassionate revisionism. I outline a theory of harm in philosophy of psychiatry. Harm consists in inadequate resources in dealing with the problems of living.

**Mladen Bošnjak, Marko Jurjako, & Luca Malatesti** (University of Rijeka)

### **"Criminal Responsibility of High-Functioning Autistic Offenders in Croatia"**

This paper investigates, from a philosophical perspective, whether offenders who are high functioning autists are legally responsible for their crimes. We do this from the perspective of the Croatian legal system. According to the Croatian Criminal Law, but also criminal laws adopted in many other countries, the legal responsibility of the person is undermined due to insanity when two conditions are satisfied. The first can be called the *incapacity requirement*. It states that a person, when committing the crime, suffers cognitive or volitional incapacities or limited capacities that are relevant for exculpation. The second, let us call it the *mental disorder requirement*, states that these exculpatory incapacities are due to the presence of a mental disorder. In this paper we focus on the incapacity requirement. The review of the studies on executive functions deficits associated with high-functioning autism suggests that many of them should not be held completely responsible for the crimes they might commit. Nonetheless, we argue that these impairments in executive functions generally do not provide complete excuse.

**Daniela Cutas** (Lund University),

**“Reproducing the Family: A Philosophical Analysis of Intra-Familial Reproduction”**

In recent decades, reproductive technologies have enabled novel uses of family members’ reproductive materials (such as gametes or uteri) or functions (such as pregnancy). These include conceiving children after the death of a partner at the initiative of the other partner; or after the death of one or both partners at the initiative of the partners’ own parents; invasive fertility preservation measures undertaken on children at the request of their parents; children being born to women who had received uterus transplants from their own mothers; and children being born to their grandmothers, who had acted as altruistic surrogates for their daughters, the children’s intended mothers. In this talk I look at what these examples might have in common. I will explore questions such as whose interests are being actualised in intra-familial reproductive endeavours, why these interests are (or are not) legitimate in determining whether they should be supported, and what the normative significance of family ties is when making these determinations. In so doing, I will also be touching on the importance of genetic reproduction, the moral status of the family, and the tensions that may arise between the family and individual interests in this context.

**Elizabeth Edenberg** (Baruch College)

**“Algorithmic Personalization and Political Understanding”**

Contemporary political discourse often feels like a battleground between diametrically opposed worldviews. Normative political disagreement is further complicated by increasing levels of disagreement over the facts (Kappel 2017, 2018; Sinnott-Armstrong 2018). Much of this division is fueled by the new ways we access information, particularly through digital means increasingly tailored to show us what we want to see. Algorithmic personalization on social media platforms ensures that we see material we are most likely to agree with, like, or otherwise engage. As a result, we find ourselves in increasingly likeminded groups that leave us in polarized epistemic bubbles (Nguyen 2020; Anderson 2021).

One way to avoid becoming “passive receptacles for other people’s opinions” (Lynch 2016, 39) would be to engage in more reflective research into topics of interest to ensure that we build a robust political understanding of our world (Lynch 2016). Unfortunately, our go-to resource for internet research is similarly impacted by algorithmic personalization. Google personalizes search results based on a users’ location, past search history, and interests (Pariser 2011, Vaidhyanathan 2011). The more you research an issue, the more tailored your search results will be. Algorithmic personalization thus impacts in pervasive ways the information we are likely to encounter—even when attempting to engage in responsible information gathering processes.

If even our best efforts to seek out political information are impacted by personalized algorithms and informational architecture that show us what we want to see, we may build models of political understanding that fail to provide an accurate picture of political reality. Reflection and further research will be little help if our information sources are skewed towards our prior beliefs. While some inaccuracies can arguably aid understanding (Elgin 2017), there are limits to the set of falsehoods that can serve this purpose. Furthermore, the illusion of understanding (de Ridder 2019) we can feel when information confirms and strengthens our political views can leave us further entrenched in our views (Anderson 2021, Lynch 2021, Mandelbaum 2019, Nguyen 2020, Talisse 2021). While the barriers to correcting these tendencies are high in our current information landscape, I will argue that we need to build mutual understanding between citizens who hold divergent models of the political landscape. Together, we can construct more accurate political understanding by drawing attention to each other’s blind spots; however, this requires engaging one another on terms of mutual respect and building a sense of community across political divisions.

**David Estlund** (Brown University)

**“One Person, At Least One Vote? Rawls on Political Equality...Within Limits”**

The precept, “One person, one vote,” is an article of faith in contemporary democracies. Nevertheless, many theorists and philosophers—historically, J.S. Mill, and recently others—have advocated unequal suffrage in order to favor the input of those who would vote more wisely. Strikingly, in *A Theory of Justice* Rawls says that Mill’s argument for such epistemically motivated plural voting is, “of the right form,” adding that, “plural voting may be perfectly just.” I will argue that this is deeply rooted in Rawls’s theory, not a mere curiosity. Rawls subordinates political equality to other basic liberties and his case for doing so is carefully considered. I go on to ask, inconclusively, what might be a good reply that is responsive to Rawls’s concerns—a strong case for a firmer commitment to equal suffrage.

**Helen Frowe** (Stockholm University)

**“Assisting the Assisters: the Comparative Claims of Afghan Refugees”**

Recent months have seen widespread endorsement of the view that Western states withdrawing from Afghanistan owe especially stringent duties of rescue to Afghans who assisted their armed forces during the twenty years of Western intervention and occupation. Although concern has been expressed for those who worked with Western states quite broadly, it is the treatment of those who directly assisted Western forces—for example, by working alongside troops as translators or interpreters—that has received the lion’s share of attention and attracted the most fervent criticism. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the view that Afghan assisters are owed especially stringent duties of rescue compared to other Afghans, such as judges, teachers, and journalists, who face similar threats of harm at the hands of the Taliban.

**Joe Horton** (University College London)

**“Evaluative Uncertainty”** (written with Jake Ross)

It is not unusual to be uncertain about what you have most reason to do. This can happen when you are uncertain about the physical world. But it can also happen when your credences are divided between rival *evaluative theories*—theories about objective reasons for action. We will refer to uncertainty over evaluative theories as *evaluative uncertainty*. Since evaluative theories include theories about moral reasons, evaluative uncertainty includes moral uncertainty.

**Tomislav Janović** (University of Zagreb) & **Heidi Maibom** (University of Cincinnati)

**“Character, Duress, and Intention: The Case of Erdemovic Revisited”**

Duress is typically taken to be an excuse, if not a justification, to a prima facie wrongdoing. To show this, philosophers and legal scholars often use dramatical counterfactual examples which then guide their reasoning even when they consider factual events. Despite its methodological charm, the problem with this strategy is that it almost never captures the subtlety of real-life cases. One such case – a case of acting under the strongest possible form of coercion (by mortal threat) – has recently been invoked by several scholars in support of duress as a defense to homicide. It is the case of Dražen Erdemović, a soldier of the Bosnian Serb Army, who was convicted (after giving himself up and pleading guilty) by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for killing at least 70 Muslim prisoners of war in the aftermath of the Srebrenica military campaign in 1995. What is ignored in examining this case are the choices Erdemović made *before* he found himself in the dreadful situation of choosing between killing and being killed. We will try to show why considering this wider picture, taking into account previous choices, is important and how it contributes to a better assessment of the most austere examples of acting under threat. Relying on arguments by Frankfurt and others about the importance of character, or second-order volitions, to responsibility, we will argue that at least some real-life cases of duress cannot be used to excuse or even exculpate offenders.

**Christa Johnson** (University of Dayton)

**“Moral Responsibility for Moral Emotions”**

Moral emotions play a crucial role in our moral psychology. They are a source of proper moral motivation and integral to our blame and praise practices. Work on moral emotions has typically focused on when and why a particular emotion is fitting. This, however, leaves open the question of whether agents have reasons to cultivate moral emotions and the extent to which an agent can be held responsible for either failing to feel a fitting moral emotion or else feeling an unfit one. These questions are likely left open for two reasons. First, as D’Arms & Jacobson (2000) have argued, we make a kind of mistake (the moralistic fallacy) when we ask about whether an emotion is morally appropriate. However, I contend that when we are speaking of moral emotions in particular, the question of moral reasons for an emotion is indeed appropriate. Second, such obligations seem to violate ought implies can. We simply do not have the relevant control over our emotions for normativity to arise. Recent literature in epistemic normativity and emotional regulation, however, might combine to suggest otherwise. Thus, this paper has two aims. First, I argue that, other things being equal, we ought to feel moral emotions. Second, I argue that we can, or at least that we are fitting targets of blame when we fail to either feel fitting moral emotions or engage in the sorts of practices that can bring about fitting moral emotional responses.

**Marko Jurjako** (University of Rijeka)

**“Naturalism and the Capacity-First Approach to Normative Reasons”**

In recent decades the reasons first approach to normativity has been very influential in metaethical discussions. This approach promised to provide a unified account of various normative phenomena with an ultimate goal of reducing normative facts to facts about reasons for belief or action. The reasons first approach construes reasons as facts that count in favor of something. However, it often leaves open what these facts are supposed to be, how they get their normative status, and how we determine what counts in favor of what. Indeed, some prominent authors adopt a primitivist view according to which reasons as considerations that count in favor are primitive facts that cannot be explained in other terms. However, from a naturalistic perspective, the reasons first approach raises several puzzles. First, such an approach relies on intuitions about reasons, without giving principled grounds for determining them. This leaves open the question where these intuitions come from and how they can be justified? Second, are these reasons facts only normatively fundamental and primitive or they can be reduced to other non-normative facts? If so, which non-normative facts they would relate to? Third, this approach does not answer the question whether and in what sense non-human animals could possess normative reasons.

I argue that turning to a capacity first approach to reasons and rationality, may provide advancement on these fronts. According to the capacity first approach, facts about reasons should be explained in terms of our capacities for epistemic and practical rationality. This approach presupposes that facts about normative reasons can be explained in terms of the capacity of reason whose proper function is determined by the principles of rationality. I argue that this approach is attractive from a naturalistic perspective for the following reasons. First, it can connect the narratives about normative reasons with naturalistic accounts of our reasoning and rational capacities. Second, it can provide a naturalistically plausible explanation of what determines proper functions of the capacity of reason and how consequently reasons emerge. Third, it can answer the question whether animals and cognitively less sophisticated creatures have reasons for action and in what sense this might be the case.

**Friderik Klampfer** (University of Maribor)

**“Political Ignorance: Its Nature, Rationality, and Moral Significance”**

If media pundits are to be believed, we are increasingly witnessing a curious, though by no means new, phenomenon in Western democracies, of people voting against their own (individual or collective) self-interests. Empirical research seems to corroborate this suspicion – most voters are fairly ignorant of disputed political issues and tend to make choices in the polling booth that are uninformed, governed by hunch and whim rather than careful deliberation and considered judgment.

In the first half of the paper, I subject to criticism the so-called thesis/theory of Rational Irrationality, or RI. According to RI, it is often practically rational, i.e. in our individual self-interest, to be epistemically irrational; with regard to political matters in particular, we are being told by an increasing number of philosophers and political scientists that ignorance is bliss – since the costs of mistaken political beliefs that any single individual (citizen, voter) personally bears are relatively small compared to the costs for him or her of acquiring true, or justified, political beliefs, it's not really worth trying to correct them.

Contrary to RI, I argue that (i) political ignorance is rarely, if ever, rationally justified all things considered; (ii) insofar as being ignorant of political issues is prudentially rational at all, its rationality is conditional on the existent, truth-indifferent or even truth-inimical structure of incentives; and (iii) the improvement of our currently deficient epistemic practices will require both fostering individual epistemic virtues and redesigning the way we do politics and communicate about it in our less than epistemically ideal social world.

In the second part of the paper, I turn my attention to alleged normative implications of pervasive political ignorance. I critically discuss proposals which treat the presumed irrationality of voting behavior as strong evidence that electoral democracy, the rule of the (ignorant) many, is flawed beyond repair and should for that reason be replaced with an epistemically superior alternative, either lottocracy or a Platonic type of epistocracy, the rule of the (knowledgeable) few. The solution to the problem of epistemic deficiency and/or alleged dysfunctionality of democracy lies, once again, not in less democracy, but in more epistemic and civic empowerment.

**Hallie Liberto** (University of Maryland)

**“Threats: The Bright Side”**

Moral philosophers and philosophers of language both attempt to distinguish threats from warnings, predictions, or promises with similar content. The most popular theories combine moral and linguistic features to mark out threats. The Dark Side (as I call it) argues that threats can be appropriately conceived as promises, but bad—some even claiming for threats the same deontic content as promises. Like promises, threats generate a new intention, or, at least, a new reason for action. Next, the Evil Ends camp argues that threats have been wrongly conceived as illocutionary acts at all; they are really just attempts to menace or to coerce, that is, attempted perlocutions. I argue against both of these views and develop an alternative account on which threats are ascriptions to a speaker of power/dominance over a hearer—usually through a self-ascription of an ability and the will to harm. I explain why these speech acts appear in so many respects like promises. I explain the relationship between linguistic and non-linguistic threats. Finally, I explain why threats cannot play the unique role in coercion to which so many moral philosophers and legal theorists attest.

**Luca Malatesti** (University of Rijeka) & **John McMillan** (University of Otago)

**“Neuroscience & Criminal Responsibility: Some Methodological Issues”**

Criminal responsibility is one of the central issues in neuroethics. While neuroscience might force us to rethink our capacity to be responsible, both in ordinary thinking and law, it also has a more immediate, practical impact in legal proceedings with regards to criminal responsibility of specific individuals or a class of individuals. There are, however, some distinctive methodological pitfalls for neuroethics in evaluating neuroscientific results and linking them to issues such as legal responsibility. Some problems

can occur when inferring normative implications from neuroscientific results. In this paper, we highlight how some of these problems arise when it is not recognised that data about brain anatomy or physiology are relevant to the ascription of responsibility only when they are significantly correlated with the psychological capacities contemplated by the legal formulations of responsibility. We frame some of the relevant methodological issues and offer recommendations on how to address these difficulties.

**Adrienne Martin** (Claremont McKenna College)

### **“Parental Pride and Self-Rationalizing Social Roles”**

I am interested in thinking about emotions as social tools. We train people to develop particular dispositions of feeling. For example, we encourage gratitude in certain contexts and discourage anger in many. As a parent, I generally think of what I’m trying to teach my children about their emotions as aimed at their individual flourishing. Of course, part of their flourishing is making their way in the social world, and so my lessons have that social aim. But I’m interested in the idea of emotional education or cultivation as serving broader *social needs*, which may or may not align with the individual’s. I’m also angry at how my country treats the creation, rearing, and educating of children—one the most essential jobs in any social arrangement—as if it were an entirely private, optional act of charity. In this paper, I look at parental pride as a social tool.

There is a trope about parental pride: that the pride we want from our parents, and the best form of pride for parents to take in their children, is self-effacing rather than self-esteeming—it is a pride that says, not “I am wonderful because of my child,” but simply, “My child is wonderful.” I present an account of pride that can serve this trope. Although the standard view of pride in philosophy and psychology is that it always takes the proud subject as object, I conceptualize a form of pride that is fully other-directed. This is pride grounded in a second-order commitment to intrinsically valuing the child, as we might find in Harry Frankfurt’s concept of *wholeheartedness*, or Christine Korsgaard’s *practical identity*, or Bennett Helm’s *intimate identification*. Call this “loving pride.”

The stories and stereotypes and other social expectations that make out loving pride as an excellence for people who do this job are implicitly urging them to identify with intrinsically valuing the children in their charge, to take themselves as defined by that valuing, or to experience that valuing as a source of meaning in life. Thus, the trope that loving pride marks excellent parenting helps rationalize the existing distribution of, and compensation for, the work of child-rearing and education, including when they are unfair.

**Simon May** (Florida State University)

### **“The Right to Do Wrong as a Normative Disability”**

Jeremy Waldron presents an analysis of an individual’s right to do wrong as the claim-right she holds against others that they not interfere with her wrongdoing. I argue here that his analysis requires revision: a claim-right to non-interference is neither necessary nor sufficient for a right to do wrong. Instead, the key element of the right to do wrong is the possession of a certain kind of normative disability. In ordinary cases of wrongdoing, the wrongdoer does not merely violate a moral duty. She also thereby exercises a normative power to change her moral relationship with other agents: other things being equal, they become morally permitted to sanction her in some way for her wrongdoing. But when the individual has a right to do wrong, I argue, her wrongdoing fails to have this consequence. This means she has no normative power to effect the ordinary moral change simply by violating her moral duty in the manner encompassed by the right. What matters, then, is not the extent to which other agents may or may not interfere with an individual’s choice, but whether her wrongdoing would change her moral relationship with others in the relevant way.

**Gene Mills** (Virginia Commonwealth University)

### **“A Modest Argument for Animal Rights”**

Against the background assumption that people have moral rights, I argue that at least some animals have them as well. Most arguments concerning animal rights—defenses and denials alike—derive from theories concerning right-conferring features (interests, desires, rational agency, first-person thought, etc.) and then argue that animals either have or lack the relevant features. Finding the plausibility of such theories hostage to their deliverances about certain cases, I argue instead from a perspective that presupposes nothing significant about right-conferring features.

The argument is this. In some cases, it would be wrong to treat an animal in a certain way even though treating it in that way would maximize utility. The only plausible explanation for such wrongness is that the treatment in question violates some right that the animal possesses. If this is the only plausible explanation, then the animal has a right. Hence the animal has a right.

The argument is doubly modest. First, its conclusion is modest: I attribute no specific rights to animals but argue just that some animals have some rights or other. Second, its dialectical ambition is modest. I aim to convince neither those who don't share my intuitions about the wrongness of certain treatments of animals nor those whose prior theoretical commitments rule out rights for animals. I aim merely to show that those who *do* share those intuitions and lack relevant prior theoretical commitments can reasonably conclude that some animals are rights-bearers. (This conclusion has *consequences* for theories of right-bearing, but it does not *rest* on any such theory.) The considerable modesty of the argument does not drain it of interest: it reaches a substantive, perhaps surprising conclusion from premises, none of which presupposes that conclusion and each of which may reasonably be believed.

**Alastair Norcross** (University of Colorado)

### **“Do the Numbers Get in the Way? Intuitional Innumeracy in Ethical Thought Experiments”**

Philosophers are fond of thought experiments, often constructing elaborate hypothetical scenarios to elicit intuitions about ethics, epistemology, mind, language, and metaphysics. In ethics, the currently dominant methodology consists of appeals to intuitions about mostly hypothetical (and often outlandish) scenarios. The intuitive judgments thus elicited (or at least avowed by the authors of these scenarios) are then appealed to in constructing and critiquing various ethical approaches. My focus in this talk is on a subclass of such scenarios, that involve, in some way or other, mathematical intuitions, especially those involving large numbers. It is well-known, and easily demonstrable, that most people's intuitions about mathematics are highly unreliable, especially concerning large numbers (whether numerator or denominator). Given this, it is highly likely that ethical intuitions about scenarios involving large numbers will also be unreliable. Ethicists need to accept that our intuitive judgments about such cases can tell us nothing about moral reality (though they may be able to tell us something about the consistency, or lack thereof, of our own commitments). This will be tough for some philosophers, whose entire careers have been built on appeals to such intuitions. But better an honest acceptance of a wasted intellect (up to this point) than a stubborn insistence on continuing to waste it.

**Matjaž Potrč** (University of Ljubljana)

### **“A Path Toward Moral Seemings”**

A path towards moral seemings as the basis of moral judgment formation is proposed, from the epistemic seemings providing subjective phenomenological experiential and deontic epistemic virtue basis in the means-to-ends support of reaching the belief formation goal. That goal may be reliable truth. But other candidates feature understanding or again knowledge in respect to the belief that P. Knowledge as the goal of belief formation brings together (a) phenomenological subjective experience, and (b) deontic requirement to follow P. Knowledge goal of belief formation provides a bridge to moral seemings as the basis of moral judgment formation, with its enhanced (a) phenomenological motivational engagement, and (b) deontic obligation to follow the correct, relevant agentive direction in the face of encountered morally charged situation. Moral seemings and moral judgment share these phenomenological and deontic features.

**Tibor Rutar** (University of Maribor)

**“Do Markets Corrupt or Do They Ennoble? Theoretical Arguments and Empirical Evidence”**

In humanities, there exists a long and enduring anti-capitalist tradition which takes the proposition that markets, especially capitalist markets, corrode various forms of human pro-sociality almost as an unquestioned given. It seems obvious to critics that money, profit, and trade stifle and decrease morally virtuous behaviour in society. In my paper, I present three basic anti-capitalist arguments one can make to this effect, and I also consider three opposing arguments broadly stemming from the Enlightenment-era ‘gentle commerce’ thesis. I show that the dispute between capitalism’s critics and proponents is, unfortunately, mostly likely unresolvable on theoretical grounds alone as plausible arguments exist on both sides. I suggest empirical evidence should be brought to bear on the subject to help resolve the theoretical dispute. There exists a vast social-scientific literature devoted to the study of this subject, but it remains poorly known to many anti-capitalist critics or remains underappreciated by them. In the paper, I present a brief summary of findings from my exhaustive literature review of more than 40 individual studies and meta-analyses testing the proposition that capitalist markets negatively impact various forms of human pro-sociality.

**Hanno Sauer** (Utrecht University)

**“Criteria of Moral Progress”**

Moral progress occurs when things change for the better, morally speaking. The topic of moral progress has recently experienced a resurgence of interest in several disciplines. However, making judgments of moral progress raises a number of epistemic questions which thus far have not been systematically addressed in the literature. We dub these *critical problems*, and argue that addressing them is important if we want to avoid errors in making judgments about moral progress. In this paper we address four important critical problems for making moral progress judgments. First, questions of what the unit of analysis is for moral progress judgments: what is undergoing morally progressive change? Second, questions of timescale: over what period of time is moral progress occurring, and is this relevant for justifying claims of moral progress? Third, what moral criteria are being used to make moral progress judgments and how are these criteria justified? Fourth, how should we make progress judgments when there has been morally progressive change from the point of view of one moral standard but morally regressive change from the point of view of another? We analyze each of these epistemic problems for making moral progress judgments, assess whether they lead to skepticism about such judgments, and suggest possible solutions to each problem.

**Neil Sinhababu** (National University of Singapore)

**“Pleasure is Goodness; Morality is Universal”**

I present the Universality Argument that pleasure is identical to goodness. The first premise analyzes goodness as whatever should please all metaphysically possible minds. This explains why all should have pleasant feelings like hope about good events, and unpleasant feelings like horror about bad events. The second premise reduces “should” to the general norm of accuracy governing perception, so that goodness makes pleasure accurate for all metaphysically possible minds. This reduction is supported by psychological evidence that moral concepts are fundamentally perceptual, not practical. The third premise is that universal accuracy consists in qualitative identity between pleasure and what it represents. This is simplest way accurate representation can be universal, also found in depiction, empathy, and onomatopoeia. If the argument is sound, ethical hedonism and naturalistic moral realism are both true.

**Matthew Smith** (Northeastern University)

**“Productive Justice”**

Most theories of justice focus on goods that must be distributed, not on the conditions governing the production of these goods. Insofar as the question of production comes up, it is assumed that incentives working via labor markets will move people to do the work required to provision the goods to be distributed. This paper explores some of the presuppositions of this view, and argues that they cannot be accepted. This paper then argues that once we begin with more reasonable assumptions, we can see that liberal labor markets—the sort traditionally presumed to be required by justice—reduce highly valuable forms of freedom. The threat to freedom posed by liberal labor markets increases dramatically as we move farther away from ideal conditions. At a certain point—and it is an open question whether we are at this point—a principled case can be made that a broad freedom to choose the work one does seriously threatens multiple forms of justice. The paper concludes by arguing that people should be compelled to do certain forms of work, but that this need not be an objectionable form of coercion.

**Daniel Star** (Boston University)

**“Aesthetic Value Pluralism, Well-Being, and Aesthetic Derivativeness”**

It is possible to take our aesthetic commitments extremely seriously (saving the appearances), yet still take aesthetic values and reasons to be ultimately explained by non-aesthetic values and reasons. This paper argues that the way to do this is to (1) adopt aesthetic value pluralism, which is an attractive position in itself; (2) explain aesthetic value pluralism by reference to an independently attractive objective list account of wellbeing; (3) come to see how it is that aesthetic normativity might lose none of its robustness given this type of explanation; and (4) come to appreciate that a crucial barrier to normative derivativeness, particularly salient when we consider the difficulty in reducing epistemic normativity to practical normativity, is not really a problem for the aesthetic derivativeness program. Arguments in aesthetics against reductive explanations of aesthetic normativity have tended to focus on hedonism, but hedonism is not the view that the aesthetic fundamentalist really needs to aim to beat.

**Julie Tannenbaum** (Pomona College) & **Stavroula Glezakos** (Wake Forest University)

**“Re-examining Consent to Unwanted Sex”**

Enthusiastic and affirmative consent requirements have been adopted by many U.S. college campuses and enshrined in some state laws. Moreover, affirmative consent models of sexual consent are advocated for by philosophers such as Tom Dougherty and Japa Pallikkathayil and law professors such as Michelle Anderson. And yet such requirements are seemingly in tension with findings by sex researchers that many men and women, college aged and beyond, report consenting to sexual activities that they did not actually want to have. Those who report such encounters often find them disturbing and possibly morally problematic, but *not* because they did not consent. This tension, between desire and consent, has led us to more closely examine enthusiastic and affirmative models of sexual consent. In our paper, we demonstrate that proponents of enthusiastic consent in fact have no one account of what enthusiasm is, or about what one must be enthusiastic. Moreover, we argue that neither enthusiasm nor explicit agreement is required for consent or morally permissible sexual encounters. We then establish the conditions under which silence is sufficient for valid consent—building on, but also departing in some key ways from, the work of Alan Wertheimer, Tom Dougherty, and John Simmons, and we explain why silent agreement can overcome the ambiguity objection raised by those who favor the affirmative consent model. If we are correct that the sexual interactions that we describe above are best understood as cases involving successful silent consent, then what morally disturbing about these encounters requires further ethical theorizing.

**Ralph Wedgwood** (University of Southern California)

**“Decision-Theoretic Virtue Ethics”**

According to the central insight of *decision theory*, in the face of uncertainty, agents should be guided by some kind of *probabilistic expectation* of some kind of *value*. How can this central insight of decision theory be incorporated within ethical theory? The main goal of this talk is to propose a marriage between decision theory and virtue ethics—that is, to articulate a kind of *decision-theoretic virtue ethics* (DTVE). This kind of DTVE is designed to provide an account of what makes acts subjectively permissible in cases where the agent is uncertain about some of morally relevant facts, and also of what makes acts objectively permissible in cases where the workings of the world are indeterministic. Specifically, this kind of DTVE is act-focused: it focuses on the virtue-properties—such as *justice* or *prudence* or *beneficence*—that are instantiated by the available acts themselves (not by the agents of those acts). These virtues come in degrees: some acts are more just, or more beneficent, than others. In this way, this kind of virtue ethics is an essentially *scalar* view; it is this feature of the view that makes it possible to unite it with decision theory in a precise and coherent way.

**Justin Weinberg** (South Carolina)

**“What Good Are Answers to Philosophical Questions?”**

The question, “what good are answers to philosophical questions?” is easy to answer if we help ourselves to a few assumptions. In this paper, I discuss some answers to this question and identify the assumptions they rely on. I then explore what happens when we give up these assumptions. I attempt to find out whether there’s value in answers to philosophical questions when we have reasons to doubt the answers are true, or reasons to doubt whether we will ever be justified in thinking any of our answers are true. The paper is a way of grappling with worries philosophers may have about the value of their own work, or the value of philosophy in general, if we are pessimistic about the possibility of correctly answering philosophical questions. Along the way, I discuss what is meant by philosophical questions and answers, reasons for skepticism about philosophy, and whether, if the answer I offer to this paper’s titular question is false, it is nonetheless good.

**Eric Wiland** (University of Missouri, St. Louis)

**“Knowing Well-Being”**

What is the relation between being well and thinking/knowing that you are well? The answer is complex. Thinking that you are doing well does not itself make you well. But, I argue, thinking that you are well still matters. It isn’t good for you in the same way that pleasure or friendship is good for you—these are *specific* prudential goods. Rather, thinking/knowing that you are well *intensifies* how well off you are. If two people differ only in the fact that the first realizes her life is good, while the second does not; the first person is doing better than the second.

**Vanessa Wills** (George Washington University)

**“Marx on the ‘Abolition’ of Morality”**

Marx’s materialism, his skepticism of bourgeois ‘justice,’ his criticisms of particular existing moral doctrines, and his rejection of moral suasion as a primary means of transforming society, do not license the claim that his was an ‘amoralist’ theory. And yet, those who read him this way are not entirely without rationale for doing so. Marx does describe the ‘abolition’ of morality as one of the welcome achievements of the communist movement. He further indicates that a fully developed communist society would be without moral reasoning, as such. Without a firm grasp of the *historicity* of Marxist theory, it is all too easy to conflate Marx’s predictions about what lies in the future with descriptions of the world at present. In this talk, I will evaluate a set of contenders for how best to express the content of Marx’s abolitionism about morality, and explain how his abolitionist view remains consistent with the practice of offering ethical critique of existing class society.