


XXIXth Bled Philosophical Conference



Applied Epistemology: Virtue, Vice, and Bias

June 5th - 9th, 2023

Bled, Slovenia

Hotel Lovec

Organized by:

Sarah Wright (University of Georgia), Friderik Klampfer (University of Maribor), and Niko Šetar (University of Maribor)

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Abstracts for all talks can be found on-line at
<http://bledconference.splet.arnes.si/abstracts/>

History. Philosophical conferences at Bled (Slovenia) were initiated, on the suggestion by John Biro, in 1993, at first as a continuation of the IUC-Dubrovnik postgraduate course in philosophy but they gradually started a life of their own, with the help, first of Eugene Mills and then Mylan Engel, Jr. They typically take place during the first week of June and are dedicated to various topics in analytic philosophy. Past conference topics have included philosophy of mind, metaphysics, truth, modality, vagueness, rationality, contextualism, ethics, particularism, political philosophy, epistemic virtue, freedom and determinism, knowledge, and group epistemology.

Monday, June 5th

	Panorama 1	Panorama 2	Pub
8:45	Welcome in the Panorama Foyer		
9:00-10:00	Georgi Gardiner <i>Virtues of Attention: An Opinionated Guide to Potential Research Topics</i>	Christoph Jäger <i>False Authority</i>	Igal Kwart <i>A Pragmatic Perspective on Assertion and the Pragmatic Expression of Biases</i>
10:05-11:05	Mona Simion <i>The Epistemology of Conceptual Engineering</i>	Benjamin McCraw <i>Pathologies of Trust: Epidemiological Social Epistemology</i>	Cat Saint-Croix <i>Debunking Doxastic Partiality</i>
Break			
11:25-12:25	Chris Kelp and Ross Patrizio <i>Testimonial Liberalism and the Balance of Epistemic Goals</i>	Peter Brössel <i>Non-Conceptual Knowledge-How</i>	Michel Croce and Matt Jope <i>Reassessing epistemic partiality in friendship</i>
Lunch			
2:25-3:25	Sven Bernecker <i>The Rationality of Evidence Resistance</i>	Branden Fitelson and Tina Eliassi-Rad <i>Algorithmic Bias: A Primer on The Impossibility Theorems</i>	Sarah Wright <i>Epistemic Reparations and Group Humility</i>
3:30-4:30	Thomas Grundmann <i>Can it ever be epistemically rational to resist the evidence?</i>	Natalia Nealon <i>Unconscious Bias as a Mechanism for Epistemic Accountability</i>	Justin McBrayer <i>The Epistemic Biases of Ideologically Homogenous Groups</i>
Break			
4:50-5:50	David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaž Potrč, and Vojko Strahovnik <i>Chromatic-Experiential Evidentialism, Epistemic Virtuosity, and Implicit Bias</i>	Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Jaakko Hirvelä <i>On Cake, Credit, and Moral Worth</i>	Jessica Brown Arché <i>Philosophical Group Dogmatism</i>

Tuesday, June 6th

	Panorama 1	Panorama 2	Pub
9:00-10:00	Martina Fürst <i>Ignorance, phenomenal knowledge, and hermeneutical injustice</i>	Guido Melchior <i>Deep Disagreement and Responsibility</i>	Niko Šetar <i>Revisiting Vice Taxonomy: Motivation, Situation-dependence, and Second-order Vice</i>
10:05-11:05	Gaile Pohlhaus <i>Intersectional Interdependence as Epistemic Resistance</i>	James Beebe <i>Virtuous Disagreement</i>	Boris Vežjak <i>What does it mean to be epistemically insouciant?</i>
Break			
11:25-12:25	Mikael Janvid <i>The Debasing Demon Resurrects</i>	Sandy Goldberg <i>How normative defeat enables us to mirror the virtues of virtue epistemology: the case of #BelieveWomen</i>	Simon Rippon <i>Epistemic Lassitude</i>
Lunch			
2:25-3:25	J. Adam. Carter and Timothy Kearl <i>Easy Practical Knowledge</i>	Joe Cruz <i>Beliefs that are Known to be Defeated</i>	Heather Battaly <i>Fanaticism and Closed-mindedness</i>
3:30-4:30	Emma Gordon <i>AR and Intellectual Enhancement</i>	Tomaž Grušovnik <i>Knowledge avoidance: A Conceptual Analysis</i>	Heidi Grasswick <i>The Vices (and Virtues?) of Ignorance</i>
Break			
4:50-5:50	Borut Trpin <i>Confirmation, Coherence, and the Strength of Arguments</i>	Rene van Woudenberg <i>Reading, Interpretation, Knowledge, and Ignorance</i>	Jonathan Ichikawa <i>Epistemic Courage</i>

Wednesday June 7th

	Panorama
9:00-10:00	David Sosa <i>Bias in Doubt</i>
10:05-11:05	Jennifer Lackey <i>Talking, Listening, and Learning</i>
	Break
11:25-12:25	Ernest Sosa <i>Methodology and Internalism Under a Dawning Light</i>

Thursday, June 8th

	Panorama 1	Panorama 2
9:00-10:00	Nico Silins <i>No Yourself: Knowledge and Cultivation in Classical Chinese Philosophy</i>	Robert Beddor <i>Moral and Epistemic Justification: Towards a Unified Account</i>
10:05-11:05	Seth Robertson <i>One-Corner Scholars and Enclosed-Mindedness: Perspective and Epistemic Vice in Classical Chinese Philosophy</i>	Gerhard Schurz <i>The Principle of Total Evidence: Justification and Political Significance</i>
	Break	
11:25-12:25	Elizabeth Fricker <i>Real and Fake Testimony</i>	Michael Hannon <i>The Construction of Epistemic Normativity</i>

Lunch			
	P1	P2	Pub
2:25-3:25	T.Y. Branch <i>Distinguishing Disciplinary Norms for Public Scientific Testimony</i>	Anna-Maria Eder <i>Evidence and Values</i>	Lauren Leydon-Hardy <i>Epistemic Infringement and the Functional Unity of Propaganda</i>
3:30-4:30	Mikkel Gerken and Dario Mortini <i>Qualified deference to science</i>	Peter Graham <i>Games, Norms, Assertion</i>	Harmen Ghijsen <i>Bizarre Conspiracy Beliefs: What's Their Epistemic Status?</i>
Break			
4:50-5:50	Katherine Dormandy <i>Fundamentalism about Science</i>	Nicholas Shackel <i>Wild Uncertainty</i>	Kelly Becker <i>Drilling Down Sometimes Just Gets You Mud</i>

Conference Dinner

Friday, June 7th

	Panorama 1	Panorama 2
9:00-10:00	Mylan Engel Jr. <i>Status Quo Bias and the Ethics of Eating</i>	Nancy McHugh <i>Extractive Knowledge: Challenges for Community Engaged Philosophy</i>
10:05-11:05	Justin Simpson <i>Towards a more-than-human social epistemology: on the possibility of nonhuman epistemic Injustice</i>	Emily McWilliams <i>Epistemic Hijacking and The Role of Motivation in Joint Inquiry</i>
Break		

		Lunch	
		P1	P2
2:25- 3:25	2:25- 3:25	Lani Watson <i>The Public's Right to Know in a Post- Truth World</i>	Jonathan Matheson <i>Why It's Ok not to Think for Yourself</i>
4:30	3:30- 4:30	Danilo Šuster <i>Lack of Evidence Reasoning: Some Epistemological Remarks</i>	Elise Woodard <i>What's wrong with political deference?</i>

Heather Battaly (University of Connecticut)

Fanaticism and Closed-mindedness

Fanatics are often viciously closed-minded. As Paul Katsafanas and Quassim Cassam have argued, fanatical members of ISIS, the Taliban, the KKK, and the Nazi party are paradigms of vicious closed-mindedness. But, must fanatics be closed-minded, as Katsafanas and Cassam suggest, or could they be open-minded? And, even if fanaticism entails closed-mindedness, must the fanatic's closed-mindedness be epistemically vicious, or could it be epistemically virtuous? This paper argues that fanatics needn't be closed-minded, and may even be open-minded. In so doing, it proposes an alternative analysis of fanaticism that is broader in scope than those of Katsafanas and Cassam. It also contends that even if fanaticism does entail closed-mindedness, the closed-mindedness it entails needn't be epistemically vicious. Case in point: insofar as the Garrisonian Abolitionists were closed-minded fanatics, their closed-mindedness was epistemically virtuous, not vicious.

Kelly Becker (University of New Mexico)

Drilling Down Sometimes Just Gets You Mud

The sensitivity principle in epistemology states that S knows that p only if, were p false, S would not believe that p. The problems with sensitivity are many, varied, and well-known. In his famous discussion and development of sensitivity, Nozick himself pointed out that to avoid counterexamples, we have to take into account S's actual belief-forming method in determining whether the principle is satisfied in a given case. Nozick also appealed to backtracking compounds to account for inductive knowledge, e.g. if it were false that the sun will rise tomorrow, then something strange would have to have happened, and since I would have known that, I would not believe that the sun will rise tomorrow. Is it licit to appeal to backtrackers? In which cases? Is it compatible with holding one's belief-forming method constant? Does this always work for inductive knowledge? What's a method, anyway? Then there is the objection that sensitivity is incompatible with knowing that one knows. Throw in Kripke's red barns counterexample for good measure. In almost every case, sensitivity theorists respond to criticisms by attempting clarification through more precision. Replace the original subjunctive with possible worlds talk (because everybody understands possible worlds, and also they're quantifiable, which together enhance our understanding [lol]), seek an exacting account of methods, explicate the relevant backtracking compound, elicit a precise reading on which one can have higher-level knowledge, offer a detailed account of when knowledge doesn't go through to known entailment, etc. In turn, criticism becomes more acute, shifting from counterexample to forced dilemma, inconsistency charge, or accusation that the whole theory is just a sloppy mess. Then sensitivity theorists play whack-a-mole, with little advance in the coveted clarity. Rather than accede to the usual bias among analytic philosophers that clarity is served by drilling down, I suggest we investigate the possibility that the unadorned (dare I say "intuitive"?) verdicts of the sensitivity conditional are and always have been correct! Objections can be answered, where necessary, by appeal to methods, backtrackers, what have you, but those features should not be built into (or at any rate taken to be essential to applying) the sensitivity principle. The principle is just the counterfactual conditional, and it's fine as it is.

Robert Beddor (National University of Singapore)

Moral and Epistemic Justification: Towards a Unified Account

In epistemology, a tremendous amount of ink has been spilled over the analysis of epistemic justification. By contrast, ethicists have not devoted much effort to trying to analyze moral justification. This state of affairs is surprising, given the way we use the term "justified" in everyday

discourse. As a corpus search reveals, speakers frequently use the term “justified” to make moral evaluations of actions. In light of this observation, this talk takes some first steps towards developing a unified account of moral and epistemic justification. The account I propose is a generalized form of reliabilism. Just as a belief is justified provided it is produced by a process that usually generates epistemic success (i.e., truth), so too an action is justified provided it is produced by a process that usually generates moral success (i.e., right action). Along the way, I discuss the relation between moral justification and other normative statuses, such as moral worth.

James Beebe (State University of New York at Buffalo)
Virtuous Disagreement

In this presentation, I report the results of a series of empirical studies that examine the web of relationships that exist between different kinds of responses to disagreement (conciliatory vs. steadfast, forming vs. not forming negative judgments about the intellect and character of those with whom one disagrees), different domains of disagreement (moral, political, scientific, historical, general), and different kinds of individuals with whom one may disagree (peers vs. experts), together with various character traits that can predict or explain many of these relationships (intellectual humility, epistemic autonomy, intellectual courage, reflectiveness, epistemic vice, dogmatism, narcissism). It is hoped that obtaining a clearer picture of how certain virtues and vices manifest themselves and interact in different domains can lead to a better understanding of the nature of these virtues, the key features that distinguish different kinds of disagreement, and how such an understanding might contribute to improving contentious public debates.

Nora Berenstain (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
Structural Gaslighting

Structures of oppression rely on epistemological foundations to orient them toward their goals of population control, containment, exploitation, and land dispossession. The epistemic legwork needed to build and sustain systems of administrative violence requires justifying stories and mythologies produced to normalize, obscure, and uphold structures of oppression. This concept of structural gaslighting, introduced in Berenstain (2020), refers to “any conceptual work that functions to obscure the non-accidental connections between structures of oppression and the patterns of harm that they produce and license,” and is essential for upholding and covering over the operations of oppressive systems. It often works by naturalizing socially produced inequalities through positing biological or cultural deficiencies in the target populations. This talk specifically explores the relationship structural gaslighting bears to both administrative violence and to scientific and philosophical knowledge production.

Sven Bernecker (University of California, Irvine)
The Rationality of Evidence Resistance

Resistance to evidence is one of the key factors explaining vaccine hesitancy and conspiracy theories. While evidence resistance is often irrational, it need not be irrational. This paper examines when and to what extent evidence resistance is epistemically irrational. While certain kinds of evidence resistance are irrational for ideal agents, they may be rational ways of managing cognitive limitations.

T.Y. Branch (University of Cologne)
Distinguishing Disciplinary Norms for Public Scientific Testimony

Scientific testimony is a vital component of well-functioning democracies. It is used in national and international policy-making. Norms surrounding what constitutes acceptable scientific testimony also has consequences for public scientific testimony, which is used by lay publics in their personal and civic lives. However, since different domains of science communication convey public scientific testimony differently (e.g. reporters, museum docents), and for different ends (e.g. science literacy, engagement), further assessment of norms within science communication is needed to have a fuller account of scientific testimony. Taking influential norms for science communication developed during the later half of the twentieth century (and calls to revise these norms) into consideration, I will argue that science journalism as a form of public scientific testimony relies on norms that make it unique from other types of science communication and public scientific testimony.

Peter Brössel (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
Non-Conceptual Knowledge-How

In this article, we offer a novel approach to understanding Knowledge-How. In the debate about the nature of knowledge-how, one can roughly distinguish two views: intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. Intellectualists claim that knowledge-how is always reducible to knowledge-that, while anti-intellectualists argue that knowing-how is sometimes distinct from knowledge-that. In this paper, we introduce a novel theory of knowledge-how, according to which many forms of knowledge-how are based on non-conceptual, embodied mental representations. Our account agrees with the intellectualist approach that whether an agent has know-how depends solely on the agent's mental representations. However, it rejects the idea that knowledge-how can always be reduced to linguistically structured knowledge-that.

Jessica Brown (Arché Philosophical Research Centre, University of St Andrews)
Group dogmatism

In this paper, I examine what it is for a group to have the vice of dogmatism and what this reveals about group evidence. Standardly, we hold that dogmatism involves a subject persisting in believing that p even against the evidence. Thus, whether a group dogmatically believes that p depends on the nature of group evidence. On a summative account, whether a proposition p is part of a group's evidence is a function of whether it is part of the evidence of some/most/all members of the group. For example, on a pooled account, p is part of a group's evidence if and only if it is part of the evidence of some member of that group. I argue that summative accounts of group evidence give counterintuitive results about group dogmatism. Thus, considering group dogmatism gives us additional reasons to endorse a non-summative account of group evidence on which it is neither necessary nor sufficient for p to be part of a group's evidence that it is part of the evidence of some of its members. Further, some groups we might initially have thought of as dogmatic turn out instead to have other vices relating to the conduct of enquiry and the gathering of evidence.

J. Adam. Carter and Timothy Kearl (University of Glasgow)
Easy Practical Knowledge

In central or well-ordered cases of intentional action, an agent knows what she's doing as she does it; her intentional actions manifest "practical knowledge." In this essay, we draw new connections between the epistemologies of mental rehearsal and suppositional reasoning to offer a novel

perspective on skilled behavior and its relationship to practical knowledge. In particular, we argue that practical knowledge is “easy” in the sense that, by manifesting one’s skills, one has a priori propositional justification for certain beliefs about what one is doing as one does it; call this “practical justification.” Our view predicts that, because agents sometimes act intentionally in epistemically hazardous environments, practically justified beliefs do not always rise to the level of practical knowledge. This proposal, if correct, has important wider consequences for debates about intentional action and knowledge: first, that the possibility of practical knowledge is much more intimately related to traditional epistemological questions about basic knowledge than has been appreciated. Second, an attractive but thus far overlooked ‘middle way’ opens up between the Anscombian tradition of defending a necessary connection between intentional action and practical knowledge and the more recent tradition of explaining away any substantive epistemic condition on actional control, on the other.

Michel Croce and Matt Jope (University of Genoa, University of Edinburgh)

Reassessing epistemic partiality in friendship

Do the norms of good friendship require partiality in judgement as well as in action? Some have argued that friendship indeed requires responding differently to evidence regarding our friends than to similar evidence about our non-friends, offering up a variety of allegedly intuitive cases of epistemic partiality in friendship that seem to violate epistemic norms. In response, others have argued that the appearance of partiality can be accounted for without any direct epistemic norm violation. In this paper we offer a response to these latter views, showing that they are committed to epistemically vicious forms of partiality after all. We then move on to challenge the terms of the debate as a whole by suggesting that not only is partiality at odds with epistemic norms, but it is at odds with norms of good friendship also.

Joe Cruz (Williams College Philosophy & Cognitive Science)

Beliefs that are Known to be Defeated

In this paper I propose some reflections on beliefs that are known by the believer to be defeated. Contrary to views that treat defeated beliefs categorically as epistemic dead ends, I propose that it is often epistemically virtuous to treat defeated beliefs in many of the ways that we treat beliefs that we take to be undefeated: to retain them in chains of reasoning, offer them in (some kinds of) testimony, and to use them as defeaters for other beliefs. This is because defeated beliefs are sometimes essential to acquiring further beliefs that have a more accurate content and are themselves more resilient against defeat.

Katherine Dormandy (University of Innsbruck)

Fundamentalism about Science

There is a surge of belief in conspiracy theories and other anti-expert accounts of events. A growing academic literature seeks to explain this in psychological terms, for example as driven by groupthink, anxiety, or a desire for certainty. What contributors to this literature tend to ignore, however, is that belief in expert accounts, often considered “mainstream,” can be similarly epistemically suspect, and subject to similar psychological explanation. Problematic belief-forming tendencies such as bias, groupthink, and anxiety-aversion can arise around belief in expert accounts too, and are well documented in the history of science. This talk explores a form of epistemically problematic belief in expert accounts that I call science fundamentalism. Science fundamentalism, it turns out, strongly resembles belief in anti-expert accounts such as conspiracy theories. One take-

home message is that, if we are not careful, the science-friendly among us may focus so much on criticizing those who believe anti-expert accounts that we fail to notice these problematic tendencies among believers of expert accounts. If science is really to be a gold standard for knowledge, we must avoid science fundamentalism and cultivate intellectual humility. We must also learn to trust without being gullible, and to criticize without being cynical.

Anna-Maria Eder (University of Cologne)

Evidence and Values

Our lives become more manageable when we share our cognitive work with someone and learn from that person. In this talk, I will focus on the case where we learn from others by receiving evidence that others have evidence for a hypothesis (see also Feldman 2007 and, similarly, Hardwig 2007). While in earlier work, I focused on the evidential conditions under which one has evidence when one receives evidence that another person has evidence, in this talk, I want to focus on the extent to which non-epistemic, social, cultural, and moral, values play a role in answering the question of when evidence of others' evidence is evidence. To answer this question, I bring together debates from epistemology and philosophy of science.

Mylan Engel Jr. (Northern Illinois University)

Status Quo Bias and the Ethics of Eating

Status quo bias—an irrational cognitive bias in favor of the status quo—often leads us to make suboptimal decisions and to engage in suboptimal behaviors. After highlighting evidence of the prevalent role that status quo bias plays in many of our ordinary decisions, I illustrate how the principal known causes of status quo bias often lead us to make inauthentic, suboptimal food choices. I conclude by offering a method for overcoming status quo bias that can help us autonomously align our dietary practices with our fundamental values so as to live more authentic and more ethical lives.

Branden Fitelson and Tina Eliassi-Rad (Northeastern University)

Algorithmic Bias: A Primer on The Impossibility Theorems

In this talk, I will provide the necessary technical background required to appreciate the recent slew of Impossibility Theorems regarding Algorithmic Bias. This will involve providing (a) some basic background in probability, and then (b) a general framework for understanding the raft of Impossibility Theorems that have recently appeared in the literature on Algorithmic Bias. I will also explain some tools we've developed which allow for the exploration and discovery of new Impossibility Theorems in this vein.

Elizabeth Fricker (Oxford University)

Real and Fake Testimony

The historically first and theoretically paradigm case of testimony is face to face, one to one telling. But extended testimony comprises a range of other cases that diverge more or less from this paradigm: personal letters and emails; radio and TV broadcasts, newspapers and magazines, and all kinds of often anonymous sources of purported information on the internet.

These still have a human or humans as their originating source. But now we have Alexa and Siri, the

‘polite young man’ who issues instructions from my phone GPS; and most recently ChatGPT. I argue that this AI testimony is fake testimony: it fulfils the intended effect of its human creators through mimicking an intentional act of communication in a natural language, but in fact is no such thing. I consider to what extent this affects the epistemology: does the difference in metaphysical kind entail a difference in epistemic kind – in how fake testimony can work to spread information?

Martina Fürst (University of Graz)

Ignorance, phenomenal knowledge, and hermeneutical injustice

In her influential work on epistemic injustice, besides testimonial injustice, Fricker (2007) analyzes hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victims lack the interpretative resources to make their experience intelligible to themselves and to others, and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. According to Fricker, for hermeneutical injustice to vanish novel public concepts need to be generated. However, establishing novel public concepts is not sufficient for fully dissolving hermeneutical injustice. The powerful might willfully ignore the novel concept or offer counterinterpretations of the target phenomenon (Pohlhaus 2012, Medina 2013).

In my talk, I argue that phenomenal knowledge is key for overcoming hermeneutical ignorance. First, I distinguish two ways of phenomenally knowing an experience: direct phenomenal knowledge, which is available only to subjects who had the target experience, and imaginative phenomenal knowledge, which is also open to subjects who did not or cannot have the target experience. Second, I discuss the possibilities and limits of gaining imaginative knowledge of the experiences of members of marginalized groups. Third, I elaborate on the relation between different kinds of phenomenal knowledge and ways of understanding the experiences in hermeneutical injustice. Finally, I show that a particular form of imaginative phenomenal knowledge and understanding is a powerful tool to fully dissolve hermeneutical injustice.

Georgi Gardiner (University of Tennessee)

Virtues of Attention: An Opinionated Guide to Potential Research Topics

Attention matters. It influences our evidence, beliefs, knowledge, and understanding. It alters conceptions of the world and self-assessments, including whether people notice the limits of their understanding. A person’s attentional patterns are deeply tied to their skills, values, environment, education, and epistemic character. The normativity of attention has epistemic, moral, social, and political importance, including for social justice and for the recent attentional crises brought about by smart phones, social media additions, and the pandemic.

An epistemology of attention is needed to better understand our social-epistemic landscape, including media, social media, search engines, political polarisation, the ethics of belief, and the aims of protest. And thus we need a groundwork—or groundworks—for theorising attentional normativity. Elsewhere (Gardiner 2022), I argue that virtue theory best illuminates the individual and social normativity of attention. In this session, I first overview important features of attention for social epistemology, I then survey potential untapped research projects about the epistemology of attention. I thus hope to encourage others to research the epistemology of attention, and I suggest some ways to proceed.

Mikkel Gerken and Dario Mortini (University of Southern Denmark)

Qualified deference to science

The scope and limits deference to science as well as the nature and rationality of such deference remains inadequately understood. In this paper, we examine several views on the matter. Given the grand nature of these questions, we try to sneak up on them by first considering the reasonable default expectations of a layperson who is at the receiving end of scientific expert testimony. We begin by arguing against a view, Prevailing Standards, according to which all one may reasonably expect is that scientific expert's testimony to be supported by evidence obtained in accordance with the prevailing methodological standards in their field. If this view were correct, it would license non-deference to scientific expert testimony. However, we argue that Prevailing Standards underestimate that scientific expert testimony is typically an epistemically superior source than other sources available to laypersons. We then consider the opposing view, Epistemic Absolutism, according to which laypersons may by default reasonably expect scientific expert's testimony to be (highly) reliable. Such a view licenses outright (defeasible) deference to public scientific testimony. Although we do not dismiss Epistemic Absolutism altogether, we take it to be too strong in a range of cases. Consequently, we consider a relational view, Epistemic Superiority, according to which laypersons may by default reasonably expect scientific expert's testimony to be the most reliable testimony that is available to S. While there are exceptions to Epistemic Superiority, we argue that they are so rare that it still captures the most reasonable general default expectation. Moreover, it rationalizes a type of appreciative deference which consists in a qualified deference to science that is based on (i) degree of reliability in the scientific D and (ii) degree of S's appreciation of testifier reliability. We argue that this is generally a reasonable default attitude to science by considering the interwoven epistemic obligations of scientists and laypersons.

Harmen Ghijzen (Radboud University)

Bizarre Conspiracy Beliefs: What's Their Epistemic Status?

There appear to be two competing epistemic approaches to bizarre conspiracy beliefs (such as the belief that COVID-19 is a hoax). The first approach pays attention to the individual believer, and claims that subjects who (continue to) hold such beliefs have often committed some sort of epistemic vice, such as gullibility, close-mindedness, or failure to take into account relevant evidence. The second approach pays more attention to the epistemic network in which bizarre conspiracy beliefs are often upheld, and attempts to show that, given the dynamics of such a network, it can be quite rational to (continue to) hold such beliefs. In this talk I will investigate to what extent these two approaches are (in)compatible and whether some sort of middle way is possible.

Sandy Goldberg (Northwestern University)

How normative defeat enables us to mirror the virtues of virtue epistemology: the case of #BelieveWomen

Virtue epistemology seems well-suited to understand the demand at the heart of the #BelieveWomen campaign. In particular, we can understand the demand as one requiring us to accept or believe knowledgeable reports of sexual harassment or sexual assault – something that can be embraced by virtue theory (in its conception of a virtuous believer as one who is reliably disposed to conform to this demand). By contrast, it is far from clear whether we can understand the demand at the heart of the #BelieveWomen campaign in e.g. evidentialist terms. The challenge – long noted by feminists and critical race theorists – is that in societies involving prevalent prejudice and oppression, one's very evidence is shaped by such forces, with the result that one can have (misleading but nevertheless real) evidence bearing on acceptance. This can make it seem as though it will be difficult for an evidentialist to understand the demand in question: how can one be demanded to accept reports in cases in which one's overall evidence (though misleading) does not

support this? In this talk I argue that evidentialists do well to embrace the doctrine of normative defeat, understood as the sort of defeat that arises in connection with evidence you should have had. Doing so will enable them to respond to this sort of concern, and in so doing to make sense in evidentialist terms of the demand at the heart of the #BelieveWomen campaign.

Emma Gordon (University of Glasgow)
AR and Intellectual Enhancement

A central topic of research at the intersection of bioethics and applied epistemology concerns *cognitive bioenhancement* – the use of the latest science and medicine aimed at improving cognitive functioning to make us ‘better than well’. Even though cognitive enhancement offers a more expedient route to acquire epistemic goods such as true beliefs and knowledge, bioconservative philosophers maintain that we should forego enhancement on the basis of arguments that appeal to (among other things) (i) the alleged ‘cheapened’ value of our (enhanced) cognitive achievements; and (ii) the idea that relying on enhancements to gain knowledge undermines our intellectual authenticity. Such arguments have focused principally on *pharmacologically mediated* cognitive enhancements – such as ‘smart drugs’, and have yet to be extended to *technologically mediated* intellectual enhancement via AR and VR. In this talk, I will outline the achievement- and authenticity-based arguments bioconservatives have raised against pharmacological cognitive enhancement and consider what versions of these arguments look like when applied to cognitive enhancement via AR. Ultimately, it will be shown, neither argument offers a compelling case to refrain from intellectual enhancement via AR.

Peter Graham (University of California, Riverside)
Games, Norms, Assertion

Is assertion constituted by a rule, like the way games are constituted by rules? There are arguments that assertion cannot be constituted by a rule, for we can break the norm of assertion in ways that we cannot break the constitutive rules of games. For these arguments to persuade, we need a persuasive account of games and what it is to play a game. Based on the emerging commitment account of playing a game, we show that we can break the rules of games in the same way we can break the norms of assertion. So at least in this sense the norm of assertion is like the rules of a game, even though, in other ways we elaborate, asserting is very different from playing games. Our conclusion leaves open the possibility, best settled by substantive work in the theory of speech acts, whether assertion is partly constituted by a norm.

Heidi Grasswick (Middlebury College)
The Vices (and Virtues?) of Ignorance

Epistemologies of ignorance have played a significant role in understanding both epistemic injustices and epistemic oppression. In this paper I examine how the frameworks of virtue and vice epistemologies contribute to this work, helping to better understand the complex role of ignorance and its repercussions for responsible knowing. Following Townley (2011), I argue for a positive role for ignorance in supporting relations of trust between knowers. Given that trust relations play a central role in our ability to obtain knowledge and understanding, a tendency to accept certain states of ignorance can be understood as a kind of epistemic virtue, allowing us to focus our epistemic attentions in other directions. In contrast, ignorance when interpreted as a certain complacency generally to remain in a state of ignorance can be understood as an epistemic vice. More interesting, however, is an examination of an agent’s propensity or lack of propensity in discerning which states of ignorance are epistemically harmful, versus productive. The more prevalent and serious epistemic

vice that needs examination is an agent's inability to recognize which kinds of ignorance negatively impact epistemic pursuits. I argue that in order to know responsibly, agents need to attend to how their ignorances affect the social landscape of knowing, and not simply their own knowledge and understanding. The social landscape shapes and limits both our own epistemic pursuits and those of others. As agents who constantly accept certain ignorances while working to overcome others, we each contribute to the determination of what knowledge is possible, not only for ourselves but for others. I argue that attending to this particularly vicious version of ignorance is a crucial element in the decolonization of knowledge, and the tackling of epistemic injustices and oppressions.

Thomas Grundmann (University of Cologne)

Can it ever be epistemically rational to resist the evidence?

Resisting the evidence may help you with protecting your prevailing opinion, ideology, self-image, or well-being. It may be argued that some of these things can be rational. But most people would agree that it cannot be *epistemically* rational. Even if one does not accept that epistemic rationality is reducible to evidence-responsiveness, evidence-resistance seems to be a paradigm case of epistemic irresponsibility or epistemic vice and thus prevents epistemic rationality. On the other hand, there are noteworthy philosophical positions such as conciliatory views of peer disagreement or the Preemption View of epistemic authority that claim exactly this, i.e., that, under specific conditions, it is rational to ignore, disregard or to be not fully responsive to the evidence. Conciliatory views require that people respond to conclusive evidence with less than the evidentially required maximal confidence when they face peer disagreement; the Preemption View requires laypeople to disregard all further evidence when they are exposed to expert testimony. Are these views effectively epistemically irrational?

In my talk, I will argue that resistance to evidence can be epistemically rational (and justified), if one possesses higher-order defeaters for the use of this evidence. This makes higher-order defeaters significantly different from rebutting or undercutting defeaters which both result from aggregating prior evidence with further evidence. I will defend the mechanism of higher-order defeat against the seminal challenges by Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2014). As I will argue, her challenges rely on a too narrow conception of epistemic rationality. I will then show how Conciliationism about peer disagreement and the Preemption View of epistemic authority can both be explained by the mechanism of higher-order defeat. So, my answer to the key question will be: "Yes, sometimes, it is epistemically rational to resist the evidence."

Tomaž Grušovnik (University of Primorska, University of Maribor)

Knowledge avoidance: A Conceptual Analysis

Drawing from different sources, Selene Arfini and Lorenzo Magnani claim that "Various psychological studies have now confirmed that there are different situations in which the majority of people would not want to know something to avoid pain, regret, or anxiety." (Arfini and Magnani 2021: 1) Indeed, as Michele Moody-Adams points out, it often seems that "the principal barrier to moral progress in beliefs is not ignorance of a revolutionary new moral idea, but affected ignorance of what can, and should, already be known." (Moody-Adams 1999: 3). Thus, a number of recent monographs dedicated their attention to active ignorance and knowledge avoidance. (cf. DeNicola 2017; Hertwig & Engel 2021) But even though knowledge avoidance is widely recognized as one of the most important factors of moral abuse across the ethical spectrum, it is nonetheless plagued with a lack of clarity regarding the precise nature and distinctive features of epistemic phenomena associated with it. A plethora of names is linked to doxastic attitudes associated with ignorance, confirming Michael J. Smithson's point that "One difficulty plaguing

‘ignorance’ is that the scattered literature on the topic lacks an agreed-on nomenclature.” (Smithson 2008: 209)

The proposed paper thus aims to provide at least a provisional taxonomy of epistemic phenomena related to knowledge avoidance. One of its main tasks will be to provide a useful distinction between voluntary (or willful) ignorance, denialism, and motivated biased belief formation. Delving deeper into the nature of voluntary ignorance (VI), it will try to distinguish between strong VI (where suspicion of avoided proposition *p* is present) and weak VI (claiming that it is feasible to have VI without having a suspicion that *p*). Moreover, it will try to distinguish between active and passive VI, the former entailing an epistemic action that prevents knowledge (of *p*) and the later designating an omission of an epistemic action that would guarantee the knowledge of *p* (claiming that active and passive VI might have tangible consequences for culpability). In general, the debate about VI will draw from some recent literature (Lynch 2016; Wieland 2017; Sarch 2018).

Michael Hannon (University of London)
The Construction of Epistemic Normativity

This paper aims to solve a puzzle for instrumental conceptions of epistemic normativity. The puzzle is this: if the usefulness of epistemic norms explains their normative grip on us, why does it seem improper to violate these norms even when doing so would benefit us? To solve this puzzle, I argue that epistemic instrumentalists must adopt a more social approach to normativity. In particular, they should not account for the nature of epistemic normativity by appealing to the goals of individual agents. Rather, they should appeal to norms or rules of inquiry that serve our collective goals. I argue that epistemic normativity grows out of our need to promote a deep kind of coordination in our basic epistemic practices. By subscribing to an appropriate system of norms, we can coordinate epistemic rule-following across the community. This makes testimony more trustworthy and reliable. This account not only solves a puzzle about epistemic instrumentalism but also sheds new light on the foundations of normativity and emphasizes the need for a truly social epistemology.

David Henderson, University of Nebraska; **Terry Horgan**, University of Arizona
Matjaž Potrč, University of Ljubljana; **Vojko Strahovnik**, University of Ljubljana
Chromatic-Experiential Evidentialism, Epistemic Virtuousness, and Implicit Bias

Much human belief fixation operates in a way that accommodates holistic evidential relevance of a large amount of background information available to the agent. Morphological content is information that is implicitly embodied in the standing structure of a cognitive system and gets automatically accommodated during cognitive processing underlying belief fixation. It is epistemically appreciated without being represented via the process we label chromatic illumination. Chromatic-illuminatory conscious appreciation of richly holistic background information is a quite ubiquitous aspect of various kinds of human rationality. Chromatic-experiential evidentialism (CEE) is a view that understands propositional justification as determined by the agent’s total conscious experience at *t* and as being a matter of holistic, abductively optimal coherence of a body of propositions. When a doxastic state with content *P* is occurrently conscious at a time *t*, the following conditions must obtain in order to be doxastically justified: (i) *P* must be propositionally justified at *t*, (ii) the doxastic state must have arisen via a causal process that would not have produced this state unless the state would be propositionally justified once it arises, and moreover (iii) this state must be consciously illuminated by a (possibly quite compound) intentional state that constitutes a propositional justificatory basis for *P*, and (iv) the agent must have an adequate degree of conscious appreciation of this *P*’s propositional-justification status. Doxastic justification, according to CEE, thus accrues to a doxastic state that has been formed in a manner that

constitutes a duly responsible, duly evidence-sensitive, exercise of one's belief-forming competence—a form of agentic competence we call credency. We also maintain that a fully adequate account of doxastic justification should be somewhat pluralistic, acknowledging the pertinence of a hierarchy of goals and subgoals that are constitutively connected to the telos of belief. In the talk, we propose such a structured view of epistemic rationality and associated epistemic virtuousness, figuring chromatic appreciation at the bottom level of the hierarchy. One challenge for such a view is the problem of epistemic benightedness. The other is the phenomenon of implicit bias. We acknowledge that morphological content and chromatic illumination can and do operate in ways not perfectly aligned with justification and consider a range of resources that are available to our view for meeting this challenge.

Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)

Epistemic Courage

I'll motivate, introduce, and explore a novel conception of epistemic courage. Epistemic courage, as I understand it, is the tendency to form and maintain one's beliefs to the right extent and in the right circumstances. This chapter models epistemic courage explicitly on moral virtues, especially moral courage: it represents the proper balance between epistemic cowardice — where one tends to suspend judgment when one ought to believe, and to let one's beliefs crumble too quickly to challenges — and epistemic recklessness, where one proceeds dogmatically, without due regard for contrary evidence. Epistemic courage centrally involves practical wisdom. I'll explain the epistemic, moral, and political importance of epistemic courage, and explore some suggestions as to how one might go about developing this important virtue.

Christoph Jäger (Berlin/Innsbruck)

False Authority

An epistemic agent A is a false epistemic authority (for short: 'false authority') for another agent S iff S falsely believes that A can, and will in suitable circumstances, effectively support S in pursuing S 's epistemic ends. A major divide exists between false authorities who present themselves as authorities and believe themselves to be sufficiently competent (*deluded authorities*), and those who pretend to be competent but do not believe that they are (*charlatans*). Both categories, however, do not cover what Lackey (2021) calls 'predatory experts': agents who systematically harm their clients by abusing the authority that is ascribed to them. Predatory experts do have advanced knowledge, but should we still count them as epistemic authorities? I explore a negative answer, arguing that predatory experts not only abuse their social status but also wreck their supposed epistemic authority by systematically undermining implicit epistemic goals of their clients.

Mikael Janvid (Stockholm University)

The Debasing Demon Resurrects

The aim of this paper is to strike a blow for the relevance of the debasing demon originally summoned by Jonathan Schaffer. I do so by, first, defending this skeptical hypothesis against critics and, second, by noting important similarities between the workings of this demon and implicit bias. Along the way, I elucidate the structure of this skeptical argument by comparing it to other more well-known skeptical arguments. I also clarify the kinds of access the debasing skeptical scenario, as well as some of the replies, require. Apart from being interesting in its own right as a different skeptical challenge, the debasing demon raises important issues regarding bias where I will primarily employ themes from epistemic decolonialization.

Chris Kelp and Ross Patrizio (COGITO Epistemology Research Centre, University of Glasgow)
Testimonial Liberalism and the Balance of Epistemic Goals

There are two broad views in the epistemology of testimony, conservatism and liberalism. The two views disagree over a particular necessary condition on testimonial entitlement: the positive reasons requirement (PRR). Perhaps the most prominent objection levelled at liberalism from the conservative camp stems from considerations pertaining to epistemic (ir)rationality; without PRR, the thought goes, epistemic irrationality looms large. In this paper we resist such a move. Drawing on work from James (1867), Goldman (1986), and Kelp et al. (2020), we draw a distinction between positive and negative epistemic measures. Positive measures concern, roughly, the acquisition of truths, whereas negative measures concern the avoidance of falsehoods. Both, it is argued, are relevant to epistemic entitlement, but this debate has proceeded in such a way as to overemphasise the importance of the latter over the former. Once this distinction is made, new conceptual terrain opens for the liberal. Rather than being resigned to a predominantly defensive role—of mitigating worries about negative measures—the liberal can go on the offensive, and explore the independent epistemic strengths of their principle with respect to positive measures. The upshot is that liberals have a new way to dispel their most prominent objection.

Igal Kvart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
A Pragmatic Perspective on Assertion and the Pragmatic Expression of Biases

In this talk I'll present the Pragmatic approach I called Bound Linguistic Steering-Thrust & Posting Pragmatics (for short: BLS'TPP). I'll apply it to attitudinal biases as well as to what can be considered Applied Epistemology involving acquired Informational/epistemic Pragmatic Stances. Already possessed informational Pragmatic Stances can be modified by Informational Steering Thrusts steering towards more accurate Epistemic Positions (construed internally), usually manifested or conferred by Informational Postings — alone, or usually together with other Steering Thrusts (e.g., attitudinal, or Action-Directed, etc. – I consider these as parts of the family of Pragmatic Stances). In particular, such Pragmatics, as I see it, is not governed by Norms of Rationality but rather by special norms of Conversational Etiquette. And specifically, the contents of various attitudinal biases are reflected by the implicit contents conveyed (which are not propositional but rather are Steering Thrusts) by Verbal Acts.

In particular, I will apply this Pragmatics to Assertion and the Epistemic Norm of Assertion, providing a fresh look about assertion, considered from a Pragmatic perspective as a Pragmatic Category, characterizable primarily in terms of Steering Thrusts. I'll look at the normative structure that governs the generation of Steering Thrusts and Postings and the constraints imposed on Verbal Acts via this new Pragmatics. This will partly be applied Philosophy (to e.g., machine translation), and specifically a type of Pragmatics as applied to Verbal Acts such as assertion and attitudinal Verbal Acts.

Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)
Talking, Listening, and Learning

The standard view in epistemology is that what really matters is that one knows, not how one knows it. So long as one has the knowledge in question, one can act on it and make assertions grounded in it. But there is reason to think that this assumption is incorrect—in many cases of knowledge, it matters that it was acquired at firsthand, through one's direct engagement with the truth to be known. As I will now argue, however, this overturning of the standard view doesn't go far enough: in some cases, what matters most is that knowledge is acquired at secondhand, from the

person whose experience is being shared. This can be the case even when the opportunity is open to us to gain the knowledge in some more direct route.

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio and Jaakko Hirvelä (University of Helsinki)

On Cake, Credit, and Moral Worth

The notion of credit plays a central role in virtue epistemology and in the literature on moral worth. While virtue epistemologists and ethicists have devoted a significant amount of work to providing an account of creditable success, a unified theory of credit applicable to both epistemology and ethics, as well as a discussion of the general form it should take, are largely missing from the literature. Our starting point is that a theory of creditable success in both epistemology and ethics – including a theory of moral worth – should fall out of a more general theory of creditable (normative) success. We lay out a theory of credit that seems to underlie much of the discussion in virtue epistemology, which we dub the Cake Theory. We argue that given the goals that virtue epistemologists and ethicists who discuss moral worth have, this theory is problematic, for it makes credit depend on the wrong facts. We also briefly consider some of the main approaches to moral worth and how they fare with our desideratum that a theory of moral worth should fall out of a theory of creditable (normative) success.

Lauren Leydon-Hardy (Amherst College)

Epistemic Infringement and the Functional Unity of Propaganda

Arationalism holds that propaganda is distinctive as a form of political speech in that it constitutively relies on bypassing audience-side rationality (Marlin, 2002; Ross, 2002; Stanley 2015). Arationalists therefore struggle to account for bald-faced propaganda, which tends to be crude, and is often absurd (Hyska, 2022). Where clandestine propaganda may elicit belief in spite of its audience's rational capacities, bald-faced propaganda is generally theorized as a flex, as a signal of the regime's might. Arationalists could respond that bald-faced propaganda is propaganda in name alone. However, the viability of this strategy turns on whether bald-faced propaganda is genuinely functionally distinct from its more surreptitious cognate. In this paper I show that the apparent functional disunity among clandestine and bald-faced propaganda is illusory. Both kinds of propaganda aim at inducing certain beliefs and attitudes, and so at illicitly constraining what is epistemically possible for their audience. Propaganda is apt to do this, I argue, because it can be a strategy for epistemic infringement.

Jonathan Matheson (University of North Florida)

Why It's Ok not to Think for Yourself

In this paper I motivate two arguments that it's OK not to think for yourself. The first argument is the argument from expertise. For almost anything you may want to think about, there is someone who is in a better epistemic position than you are to determine the answer to your question. This fact seems to make thinking for yourself a recognizably less reliable route to the truth, and thus not a recommended course of action. When you have a better route to the truth, you don't need to think for yourself. The second argument is the argument from evidential swamping. What you should believe about an issue is determined by the state of expert opinion on the matter. If there is consensus amongst the relevant experts, then you should believe as they do. If there is extensive disagreement amongst the relevant experts, then you should suspend judgment. This is the lesson from the literature on the epistemic significance of disagreement. Whatever evidence you would get from thinking for yourself will be entirely swamped by the weightier higher-order evidence

concerning expert opinion. So, since thinking for yourself won't change what you should believe (or how justified you are in believing it), it is OK not to think for yourself. I then consider a number of objections to this conclusion including that it amounts to free-riding, that some questions demand that you think about them for yourself, and that in not thinking for yourself you leave yourself vulnerable to the manipulation of others.

Justin McBrayer (Fort Lewis College)

The Epistemic Biases of Ideologically Homogenous Groups

We carry out most of our most serious epistemic projects as groups. Networks of individuals work together to identify questions, accumulate evidence, and settle on answers that lie beyond the ken of individual knowers. These groups can be homogenous or diverse in many different ways, some of which are epistemically relevant and some of which are not. In particular, ideologically homogenous groups are prone to a number of biases. That means when it comes to ideologically contested issues, groups that are ideologically diverse are epistemically superior to groups that are ideologically homogenous. That's because ideologically diverse groups are better at (a) identifying a representative sample of important questions, (b) developing a wider range of potential answers, (c) evaluating the evidence for and against each hypothesis, and (d) disseminating the answers in ways that garner more trust from the non-expert community. The implication is that when it comes to ideologically contested issues, it is epistemically better to build social networks with ideologically diverse membership.

Benjamin McCraw (University of South Carolina Upstate)

Pathologies of Trust: Epidemiological Social Epistemology

Recent approaches to the social epistemology of belief formation have appealed to an epidemiological model, on which the mechanisms explaining how we form beliefs from our society or community along the lines of infectious disease. More specifically, Alvin Goldman (2001) proposes an etiology of (social) belief along the lines of an epistemological epidemiology. On this "contagion model", beliefs are construed as diseases that infect people via some socio-epistemic community. This paper reconsiders Goldman's epidemiological approach in terms of epistemic trust. By focusing on beliefs as diseases, Goldman misconstrues and underestimates the central role that epistemic trust plays in their formation (maintenance, revision, etc.). I suggest that we put trust, accordingly, as the center of an epidemiological model of social doxology—epistemic trust, rather than beliefs, is the disease with which one is infected. So, contra Goldman, beliefs themselves aren't the disease—they are symptoms. Trust, on this approach, can be viewed as a pathology. This point connects Annette Baier's (1994) work on moral trust—taking a cue from her "pathologies of trust". The real pathology centered in social doxology is the epistemic trust manifested by those beliefs. Accordingly, I shall explore (and tentatively defend) an epidemiological model for such 'pathological' epistemic trust inspired by Baier's work on moral trust; one which can more adequately account for the infectious epistemic trust at work in social belief formation.

Nancy Arden McHugh (University of Dayton)

Extractive Knowledge: Challenges for Community Engaged Philosophy

Wealth extraction is the result of nations, states, cities, and corporations removing resources from communities and setting up conditions so that future wealth in these communities cannot be obtained, accessed, and accrued. In the US redlining, the historical practice of race-based grading of neighborhoods to both segregate people and to ensure white wealth, is a prime example of national,

state, city, and corporate sanctioned and enabled wealth extraction. Most formerly redlined communities in the US are still highly impacted from the loss of resources in these communities and the ongoing difficulties in bringing wealth back or to these communities.

There is an epistemically parallel structure to wealth extraction—extractive knowledge. Extractive knowledge is not a new practice. Like wealth extraction, it has a long history in settler colonialism. Settler colonialists took knowledge, such as land knowledge and scientific knowledge, from communities, casting it as their own and shaping it for their own uses. The rise of community engaged philosophy in the past twenty years has been remarkable and has had substantial benefits for students, philosophy, and many communities. However, it has not come without its impacts, extractive knowledge being one of these. Extractive knowledge results from a combination of epistemic vices and from what we can think of as transactional relationships with community members or community nonprofits. These are largely superficial relationships and perpetuate injustice in spaces that imagine themselves to be working to create greater justice. This paper has two aims: 1. To develop the concept of extractive knowledge in community engaged philosophy showing the ways that it results from epistemic vices. 2. To develop strategies and models for more just approaches to community engaged philosophy that shape knowledge in ways that are epistemically responsible and in partnership with communities or in alignment with community goals and outcomes.

Emily Colleen McWilliams (Duke Kunshan University)
Epistemic Hijacking and The Role of Motivation in Joint Inquiry

Joint inquiry is a social activity, in addition to an epistemic one. It serves a broader set of social-psychological needs, beyond inquiry's constitutive epistemic ends. For instance, inquiry about issues that matter to us, with people who matter to us, often involves trying to understand and express ourselves, in addition to improving our understanding of the subject of inquiry.

More precisely, I argue that there are 3 categories of motives that we bring with us to joint inquiry: (1) inquiry-relevant epistemic motives: epistemic improvement on the topic (s) or questions under investigation; (2) self-regarding epistemic motives: motives to understand and create aspects of our identities and self-understandings; and (3) expressive motives: motives to express or perform aspects of our identities and self-understandings. Often, inquirers are likely trying to do all of these things. But individual contributions that aim at (2) and (3) can sometimes subvert or derail (1).

I argue that when we engage in inquiry across unjust divisions of social power, marginalized inquirers' epistemic agency can be subverted or hijacked to serve the self-regarding aims of dominant inquirers (2 & 3), rather than the shared aims of joint inquiry (1). I argue that this phenomenon – epistemic hijacking – represents a unique class of epistemic wrongs that is common in everyday life but has not been explored in the literature on epistemic oppression.

Guido Melchior (University of Graz)
Deep Disagreement and Responsibility

The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. Intuitively, two parties deeply disagree if they do not only disagree about particular propositions but, more generally, about how to settle the disagreement in general. In the first part of this paper, I argue that the notion of deep disagreement is too ambiguous and unclear for being useful. I suggest to theorize about rationally irresolvable disagreement instead, which occurs between subjectively rational parties who follow their own distinct views about rationality. In the second part, I reflect on

moral aspects of rationally irresolvable disagreement. In particular, I will discuss whether subjects who consequently follow their own standards of rationality can be held responsible for not reaching agreement.

Natalia Nealon (University of California, Irvine)
Unconscious Bias as a Mechanism for Epistemic Accountability

When engaging with testimony, hearers may possess integrated beliefs that allow them to hold their interlocutors to certain expectations. Foundational beliefs and social intelligence tied to social contract, conversational courtesies, and norms of assertion—to name a few—inform what an agent ought to expect from their interlocutors, how they should rely on the testimony, and when to trust speakers. When a speaker gets it wrong a violation against the hearer has taken place that may require a certain level of epistemic accountability for their failings. For example, Scheman discusses the role of corrective trust and distrust to deal with cases where trust has been broken, whereas Origg considers effects on public reputation. Empirical studies even show that children as young as 24 months will make a point to ignore or withhold judgment when confronted with unreliable testifiers. I argue that unconscious bias can also function as a mechanism for epistemic accountability. Here, I am particularly concerned with the biasing of unconscious attention selection, where an agent may ignore or fail to process the testimony of a perceived unreliable speaker, as a means of holding them epistemically accountable for testimonial failings. This feature of unconscious attention will in turn act as further incentive for speakers to operate in such a way that meets the expectations of the hearer.

Gaile Pohlhaus (Miami University)
Intersectional Interdependence as Epistemic Resistance

In this paper, I elaborate on a form of epistemic resistance to oppression I have previously called “epistemic gathering.” Drawing on the work of Sara Ahmed and José Medina, epistemic gathering is a form of resistance that works against what I call “sense disintegration,” or the depoliticization and stretching beyond critical sense of conceptual tools meant to track and counter oppression. Starting from Kimberlé Crenshaw’s suggestion that we consider social identities as “potential coalitions,” I argue that epistemic gathering is most powerful when individuals within them attend explicitly to intersectional interdependence, or the necessity of working from differences in non-dominant social positions rather than sameness, as can be found in the work of women of color feminists such as Audre Lorde and María Lugones.

Simon Rippon (Central European University)
Epistemic Lassitude

In this talk, I will explore an epistemic vice that I call “epistemic lassitude”. It is a vice of failing generally to perceive genuine sources of evidence and information as epistemic opportunities. It frequently manifests itself as a kind of sweeping (though frequently domain specific), undisciplined skepticism or hopelessness about knowing, including (but not limited to) skepticism about expertise. It is vicious primarily because it leads people to ignore or reject valuable epistemic opportunities, and thus tends toward the production of ignorance and apathy. I believe it is of interest particularly because it tends to arise as a reaction to a certain kind of information environment and because it is often induced intentionally in significant parts of the population by authoritarian regimes. I will discuss the production of epistemic lassitude, its nature and its relation to and differences from other epistemic vices such as epistemic paralysis and dogmatism, an

opposite vice and the virtuous mean, its political significance, and why it may have been previously overlooked in the literature.

Seth Robertson (Harvard University)

One-Corner Scholars and Enclosed-Mindedness: Perspective and Epistemic Vice in Classical Chinese Philosophy

While virtue ethical interpretations of major schools of thought in classical Chinese philosophy abound (e.g., Van Norden 2003; 2013; Sim 2015; Huang 20120), there is substantially less corresponding work on epistemic virtue and vice (but see, for example, Kidd 2018). In this paper, I argue that philosophers across a range of divergent and competing approaches in ancient China were interested in a distinctively perspectival kind of epistemic failing: a form of close-mindedness (see Battaly 2018; 2020) that I will call “enclosed-mindedness” (a key term for being stuck in a limited perspective, “囿” yòu, literally meant barnyard pen or enclosure). I will explain how the contours of philosophical debate in ancient China (which I won’t expect the reader to have any antecedent familiarity with or exposure to) facilitated interest in and concern about the epistemic limitations of entrenched perspectives. Then, I will describe in more detail how several different forms of enclosed-mindedness were theorized, especially, but not only by the philosophers Xunzi (310-238 BC) and Zhuangzi (339-286 BC). Notably, some forms of enclosed-mindedness manifested as general epistemic vices, pernicious for any epistemic agent, while others manifested more specifically as philosophical vices. These philosophical vices leave us fixated on certain theoretical desiderata at the expense of others, or enamored with the strengths of our preferred theories, and thus unable to recognize their limits or weaknesses, all the while threatening to turn us into what Zhuangzi memorably called “one-corner scholars” (一曲士 yī qū shì).

Gerhard Schurz (Heinrich Heine University Duesseldorf)

The Principle of Total Evidence: Justification and Political Significance

The principle of total evidence (Carnap 1950) says that one should conditionalize one’s degrees of belief on one’s total (relevant) evidence. In the first part of the talk I propose a justification of this principle in terms of its epistemic optimality. It is based on a proof of Good (1983) that demonstrates that by conditionalization of one’s rational degrees of beliefs on new pieces of evidence, the utility of one’s actions can only increase but not decrease. I show that this proof can be transferred from the practical utility of actions to the epistemic success of beliefs as measured by any reasonable scoring function. The proposed justification is embedded into a new account of internalist epistemology based on optimality-justifications (Schurz 2023).

In the second part of the talk I discuss a possible conflict of the principle of total evidence with political requirements of anti-discrimination. Should information about gender be included in the relevant evidence for a job qualification? I argue that if one assesses the qualification of a person in terms of those properties that are directly causally relevant for the job performance, then properties that are merely indirectly relevant, such as gender, are screened off, i.e., they become irrelevant. So conditionalization on more information reveals the irrelevance of possibly discriminating variables and, thus, is not really in conflict with anti-discrimination.

Niko Šetar (University of Maribor)

Revisiting Vice Taxonomy: Motivation, Situation-dependence, and Second-order Vice

Drawing up a complete taxonomy of epistemic vices has recently become the objective of many virtue and vice epistemologists, the most prominent attempt likely being the one detailed in

Cassam's seminal *Vices of the Mind* (2019). Many aspects of the nature of epistemic vice still remain open to discussion, such as their motivational and situational components. In this paper, I will attempt to address three such aspects.

The first part will consider the role of motivation in vices, where I shall argue that while motivation is not a necessary component of perpetrating a vice as a motivationalist would claim, it is a possible one, and that it may be either instrumental or non-instrumental (Kidd, 2016). The second part inquires as to the role of situational or social dependence of vice, where I will attempt to show that, due to inherent heterogeneity of vice, some may be completely situationally independent, while others are nothing less than rooted in their context and would not manifest in a different one. Lastly, the third part draws a distinction between first-order vice (ones that obstruct one's access to knowledge) and second-order vice (ones that obstruct someone else's access to knowledge).

Nicholas Shackel (Cardiff University)

Wild Uncertainty

In this paper I exhibit a peculiar problem that uncertainty poses for rational belief and distinguishing tolerable from dangerous risks. Even when we know the probabilities, and contrary to what many believe, not all uncertainty that matters is tamed by that knowledge. Wild uncertainty means we lack the warrant to assume that our models deliver accurate probabilities and reliable predictions. Consequently, attempts to engineer our responses to risks on the basis of an unwarranted assumption of tamed uncertainty deliver us from the realm of dangerous risks not, as is assumed, into the realm of tolerable risk, but into the realm of treacherous risk. We should give up the pretence that we can engineer our responses when faced with wild uncertainty and recognise that the wilds are unavoidably the demesne of judgement.

Nico Silins (Cornell University)

No Yourself: Knowledge and Cultivation in Classical Chinese Philosophy

According to an important traditional view of Confucian ethical self-cultivation, self-knowledge is necessary both as a means towards as well as a goal of self-cultivation. I examine what exact forms this self-knowledge might take, and go on to develop a series of skeptical challenges to the traditional reading. My conclusion is that self knowledge plays at most a peripheral role in Confucian self-cultivation.

Cat Saint-Croix (University of Minnesota)

Debunking Doxastic Partiality

Doxastic partiality is the idea that significant relationships, such as friendship, bring with them doxastic obligations that depart from our ordinary epistemic standards of justified belief. Such obligations may be positive—for example, that we believe a friend is innocent in spite of evidence to the contrary (Stroud, 2006)—or negative—for example, that we forget a significant other's most embarrassing moments (Basu, 2022). I argue that neither obligation holds. Rather, these felt obligations arise from obligations on our attention concerning those with whom we have built significant relationships. This account not only preserves many of the intuitions toward which defenders of doxastic partiality draw our attention, but also better accounts for nuanced cases in which evidence ought not to be ignored. More generally, I argue, obligations of attention are negotiated and shaped by social expectations, and are governed by a moral obligation to attend to what is morally significant. Insofar as such obligations are grounded in the epistemic consequences

of attending, however, this thesis suggests that, while doxastic partiality is false, epistemic partiality is nevertheless true. Failing to govern one's attention well can be both a moral and epistemic vice.

Mona Simion (COGITO University of Glasgow)

The Epistemology of Conceptual Engineering

In this talk, I sketch the beginnings of an epistemology of conceptual engineering. I argue that our conceptual innovation practices are governed by epistemic oughts sourced in representational needs, as well as restricted by epistemic limitations. More precisely, I propose that a linguistic community has an obligation to generate a particular representational device insofar as there is a categorical need of an increase in expressive power in the community at stake, which would thereby be alleviated, there is capacity to generate the representational device in question, and there are no overriding reasons against doing so; in turn, categorical needs are unpacked as pertaining to proper cognitive functioning.

Justin Simpson (University of Texas Rio Grande Valley)

Towards a more-than-human social epistemology: on the possibility of nonhuman epistemic injustice

Seeking to move beyond environmental ethics based on passivity and the ability to suffer, this paper presents a more positive account of nonhumans as epistemic agents with tacit, embodied knowledge. To prevent epistemic depreciation turning into ethical indifference, this paper considers whether it is possible to commit epistemic injustices against nonhumans. Such a question reveals an anthropocentric bias within seminal accounts of epistemic injustice, which assume that knowledge requires propositional language. Due to this assumption, nonhumans supposedly cannot be subjects of knowledge, let alone epistemic authorities. By challenging this assumption and considering the possibility of nonhuman epistemic injustice, this paper hopes to not only elevate the significance of nonhumans but also make social epistemology more social through the inclusion of nonhumans.

Danilo Šuster (University of Maribor)

Lack of Evidence Reasoning: Some Epistemological Remarks

Lack of evidence reasoning (argument from ignorance, absent evidence reasoning) is sometimes curiously described as a fallacy (*ad ignorantiam*) which is not always fallacious or even “a much prized rational resource that has been bestowed on us by evolution” (Cummings 2015). How could that be? Three patterns of reasoning should be distinguished: (i) the Good (negative evidence; the subject enjoys epistemic coverage); (ii) the Bad (appealing to ignorance “proper”) and (iii) the Ugly (shifting the burden of proof). One structure, but different instantiations (modern mainstream) or three different forms, one of them always defective (Adler)? How to separate the Good from the Bad? The fallacious scheme is supposed to be: “No one has disproved (refuted) that p. So, p’s truth is seriously possible and we should keep our minds open to the investigation of p’s truth.” But open-mindedness is also a paradigmatic intellectual virtue. I try to address some of these issues from the epistemological point of view (virtue epistemology, higher-order evidence).

Borut Trpin (University of Maribor, LMU Munich)

Confirmation, Coherence, and the Strength of Arguments

Argumentation is central to science, law, and everyday life. But what characterizes a good argument? Relatedly, which arguments are bad, and how can we rank arguments (if at all)? Philosophers have

grappled with such questions for centuries. Because uncertainty plays a central role in argumentation, the theory of Bayesian argumentation has gained prominence in recent years. This theory offers the possibility of measuring the strength of an argument in probabilistic terms. One obvious possibility, implicit in much work, is to identify the strength of an argument by how much the premises confirm the conclusion. Such approaches only consider the outcome of an argument — how much more convinced the audience is in the conclusion due to the premises. However, the strength of an argument seems to have something to do with how much the premises and the conclusion of the argument cohere with each other. This leads to a new probabilistic measure whose advantages and disadvantages will be discussed.

Rene van Woudenberg (VU Amsterdam)

Reading, Interpretation, Knowledge, and Ignorance

Analytic epistemologists (like Alston, Goldman, Sosa, Plantinga, Audi, Lackey, Pritchard, Zagzebski, etc.) haven't paid attention to reading, nor to the phenomenon of textual interpretation, even though we read a lot and often seem to engage in interpretation—and even though we come to know many things through reading (and interpretation.) Is this lack of attention due to the fact that reading reduces to well-studied sources of knowledge, for example to perception, or to attending to testimony? I argue that no such reduction is possible, and hence that this doesn't explain the neglect of reading among epistemologists. Next, I analyse what it is to read, and discuss whether reading is factive; my answer is that some is, but some isn't—as we need to distinguish between various kinds of reading, and between kinds of reading knowledge. Subsequently I discuss the platitude that reading necessarily involves interpretation; after distinguishing various kinds of interpretation (among others, Dilthey's 'ignorance-based difficulty account of interpretation'), I argue that there is a possible world in which there is reading without interpretation. I then argue that in the actual world reading contingently involves some kinds of interpretation.

The epistemological study of reading and interpretation is part of what could be called “Philosophy of the Humanities”, a field of philosophical reflection juxtaposed to the well-established field of “Philosophy of Science”. Also, this study is groundwork for applied epistemology in the humanities.

Boris Vežjak (University of Maribor)

What does it mean to be epistemically insouciant?

There are different formulations of what counts as an epistemic vice and what it is by definition: maybe a character trait, an attitude or a way of thinking? On the one hand, malevolence is a classical example of it, but so is lying, which harms us as knowers because it impedes our attempts to acquire knowledge (Cassam 2019). On the other hand, there is epistemic insouciance, which is close to the notion of bullshit (Frankfurt 2006). However, it is not quite clear what exactly the insouciance in question is. One example: is it only an epistemic vice or a moral defect as well?

Meyer, Alfano and de Bruin (2021) developed a ten-item scale of epistemic vice and the relationship between the latter and misinformation and fake news. One of the examples of epistemic vice is indifference to knowledge; they hypothesize that epistemically vicious people are especially susceptible to misinformation and conspiracy theories. If lying is committed to the truth, bullshitting is not. It often seems to be socially and politically more successful, even preferable to lying. But if political liars of all sorts have been replaced by bullshitters and the creators of fake news, misinformation and propaganda simply cannot be accused of lying in the full sense. This clearly shows the social success of epistemic insouciance and the failure of lying. In a fundamental sense, propaganda is no longer deliberate deception and fake news is no longer deliberate

fabrication. So it looks like if lying is a moral failure, bullshitting and epistemic insouciance are not necessarily.

Lani Watson (University of Oxford)
The Public's Right to Know in a Post-Truth World

The notion of a public 'right to know' has been advocated since at least the end of the Second World War. In a 1945 speech, Kent Cooper, the then Executive Director of the New York Associated Press asserted: "Don't forget that when we plan to enshrine freedom in any field, the first requisite is the right to know." This is, I believe, as true now as it was in 1945. The public right to know should remain a cornerstone of contemporary efforts to regulate public debate and mitigate the effects of misinformation, fake news and post-truth in the so-called Information Age. In this talk, I provide an exposition of the public's right to know, derived from analysis of the more general concept of epistemic rights. I present three levels of protection for the public's right to know and raise, in each case, the question of when and whether these protections are sufficient.

Elise Woodard (MIT)
What's wrong with political deference?

Deference in politics is often necessary. To answer questions like, "Should the government increase the federal minimum wage?" and "Should the state introduce a mask mandate?", we need to know relevant scientific and economic facts, make complex value judgments, and answer questions about incentives and implementation. Lay citizens typically lack the time, resources, and competence to answer these questions on their own. Hence, they must defer to others. But to whom should they defer? A common answer is that they should defer to co-partisans. This view has been defended on both normative and empirical grounds. Despite these defenses, I argue that deference to co-partisans has overlooked moral and epistemic problems. In light of them, I propose several new ways to restructure our expectations of citizens in a democracy both interpersonally and institutionally.

Sarah Wright (University of Georgia)
Epistemic Reparations and Group Humility

A duty to provide epistemic reparation will require actions of us. Jennifer Lackey has argued that victims of atrocities have a right to be known, in addition to the U.N. defended right to know. These rights will place a corresponding duty on at least some to act in epistemically restorative ways. But how is this action to be properly motivated? Within a virtue-theoretic framework, we can change this to the question, what virtues are called for in the work of epistemic reparations?

Humility is a virtue that is concerned with our recognizing the harm that we have done and guarding against future errors. While there are competing accounts of the nature of humility, the dominant account is that defended by Whitcomb et. al.. They argue that (epistemic) humility is owning your (epistemic) limitations. As an individual, we own our limitations by recognizing them with the right attitude, taking responsibility for them, and working to overcome them. But groups may have their own limitations and so the virtue of humility for groups may take a different form.

Elizabeth Anderson and José Medina have both recently argued that groups may have vices that are not reducible to the vices of the individuals that make them up. The discursive norms that govern the group conversations may limit the reasons that a group considers in its reasoning, and the

epistemic norms of the group may limit what the group recognizes as a relevant consideration. As groups control and limit what is to be recognized as socially important and to be taught to the next generation, epistemic injustices, even those committed by an individual, may be the result of situated ignorance caused by group limitations, not any character trait of that individual. For limitations only possessed at the group level, epistemic humility will require a group owning its own group limitations.

But how can a group own its limitations, particularly when those limitations are not possessed by individual members of the group, but rather are manifested only by the group as a whole? I argue that a group can own its collective limitations in a way parallel to the individual — by recognizing them in the right way, taking responsibility for them, and changing the group norms to overcome them.

Recognizing the possibility of a group owning its limitations gives us new resources to answer a traditional objection to reparations in general — that the person or group asked to provide reparations is not the same as the one who inflicted the original harm. Collective ownership of a limitation is not the same as individual ownership — in fact, group limitations cannot be properly owned by the individual. Still, individuals can be part of groups that own their limitations, and this collective owning can filter down to duties at the individual level.